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Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der intergenerativen Einkommens-
mobilität in Deutschland im Vergleich zu den USA. Im Zentrum der Analyse steht
demnach die Frage, inwiefern Einkommensunterschiede zwischen armen und reichen
Familien an die nächste Generation weitergegeben werden. Diese Thematik wird
sowohl in der Ökonomie als auch in der Soziologie seit mehreren Jahrzehnten disku-
tiert, dennoch sind  auch auf Grund der unzureichenden Datenverfügbarkeit in den
meisten Ländern  viele Fragestellungen oﬀen. Die vorliegende Arbeit setzt an der
vorhandenen Literatur an und gliedert sich in drei Hauptkapitel, die jeweils einen
bestimmten Aspekt der intergenerativen Einkommensmobilität untersuchen und als
eigenständige Forschungsarbeiten zu betrachten sind. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf der
empirischen Analyse der jeweiligen Fragestellung mithilfe vorhandener Daten des
sozioökonomischen Panels (SOEP) für Deutschland und der Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) für die USA.
Der erste Teil der Arbeit untersucht Struktur und Ausmaß der intergenerativen
Einkommensmobilität in Deutschland und den USA. Dafür werden unterschiedliche
Mobilitätsmaße berechnet und die Ergebnisse für beide Länder miteinander vergli-
chen. Im Einklang mit der bestehenden Literatur fällt die intergenerative Einkom-
menselastizität in Deutschland geringer aus als in den USA, was für eine höhere
Mobilität in Deutschland spricht. Vergleicht man jedoch die intergenerative Rang-
mobilität, sind die Ergebnisse für beide Länder relativ ähnlich. Bei der intergenera-
tiven Einkommensanteilsmobilität bestehen dagegen stärkere Unterschiede zwischen
Deutschland und den USA. Mit jedem höheren Perzentil sinkt die Einkommensan-
teilsmobilität der Söhne im Vergleich zu ihren Vätern in Deutschland weniger stark
als in den USA. Die Regression zur Mitte ﬁndet demnach in Deutschland langsamer
statt als in den USA, was für eine höhere Mobilität in den USA spricht. Die Ergebnis-
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se der bedingten und unbedingten Quantilsregression liefern für keines der beiden
Länder Hinweise auf Nichtlinearitäten. Eine abschließende Dekomposition der in-
tergenerativen Einkommensungleichheit ergibt für Deutschland sowohl eine größere
Einkommensmobilität als auch ein stärkeres progressives Einkommenswachstum als
für die USA. Insgesamt kann keine klare Rangfolge hinsichtlich der intergenerativen
Einkommensmobilität in Deutschland und den USA festgestellt werden. Abschlie-
ßend werden mögliche Politikmaßnahmen erläutert, die zur Erhöhung der interge-
nerativen Einkommensmobilität in Deutschland beitragen könnten.
Der zweite Teil der Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, über welche
Transmissionskanäle das Einkommen der Eltern das Einkommen ihrer Kinder be-
einﬂusst. Dabei sind imWesentlichen zwei Mechanismen denkbar. Zum einen können
wohlhabende Familien mehr Geld in das Humankapital ihrer Kinder investieren, wo-
durch diese später ein höheres Einkommen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt erzielen. Dieser
Kanal wird als Investitionseﬀekt bezeichnet und beinhaltet beispielsweise den Besuch
einer privaten Schule oder Universität oder die Finanzierung privater Nachhilfestun-
den. Zum anderen verfügen Eltern mit einem hohen Einkommen tendenziell auch
über ein höheres Humankapital, das sie auch ohne den Einsatz ﬁnanzieller Mittel an
ihre Kinder weitergeben können. Darunter fallen die genetische Weitergabe bestimm-
ter Eigenschaften, die innerfamiliär erlernten Einstellungen und Ziele, aber auch ge-
zielte nicht-monetäre Investitionen in das Humankapital der Kinder, zum Beispiel in
Form von pädagogisch hochwertiger Freizeitgestaltung oder Unterstützung bei den
Hausaufgaben. Dieser Kanal wird als Humankapitaleﬀekt bezeichnet. Die empirische
Analyse mithilfe unterschiedlicher Dekompositionsmethoden zeigt, dass der Investi-
tionseﬀekt und der Humankapitaleﬀekt in Deutschland zu etwa gleichen Teilen zur
geschätzten intergenerativen Einkommenselastizität beitragen, während in den USA
der Investitionseﬀekt vor allem in den oberen Perzentilen deutlich stärker ausgeprägt
ist. Im Hinblick auf die im Vergleich zu Deutschland deutlich höhere Privatisierung
des Bildungssektors in den USA scheint dieses Resultat plausibel. Für die Politik
in Deutschland bedeuten diese Ergebnisse, dass die bloße Bereitstellung ﬁnanzieller
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Mittel für Kinder aus armen Familien nicht ausreicht, um ihre Aufwärtsmobilität
zu fördern. Zusätzlich muss die fehlende direkte Weitergabe von Humankapital in-
nerhalb sozioökonomisch schwacher Familien durch staatliche Angebote substituiert
werden.
Während sich die bisherige Analyse auf Väter und ihre Söhne beschränkt, ist
das Ziel des dritten Teils der Dissertation eine Untersuchung der intergenerativen
Einkommensmobilität der Töchter. Der Hauptgrund für diese in der Literatur übli-
che Restriktion sind Probleme bei der statistischen Analyse, die sich aufgrund der
geringeren Arbeitsmarktpartizipation von Frauen im Vergleich zu Männern ergeben.
Während Männer fast immer Vollzeit arbeiten, sind nach wie vor viele  insbesonde-
re verheiratete  Frauen nur in Teilzeit oder gar nicht berufstätig. Das individuelle
Einkommen der Tochter ist daher in vielen Fällen kein geeignetes Maß für ihren tat-
sächlichen Wohlstand. Gerade wenn assortative Paarung stattﬁndet  also Töchter
wohlhabender Familien tendenziell auch gutverdienende Männer heiraten und sich
infolgedessen für eine geringere Anzahl an Arbeitsstunden entscheiden  kann die ge-
schätzte Einkommenselastizität verzerrt sein. Eine erste Basisregression zeigt, dass
die intergenerative Einkommenselastizität der Töchter in Deutschland höher ausfällt
als die der Söhne, während es in den USA gerade umgekehrt ist. Eine Trennung nach
Familienstand macht jedoch deutlich, dass in beiden Ländern unverheiratete Frauen
eine höhere Einkommenselastizität aufweisen als unverheiratete Männer, wohinge-
gen für verheiratete Frauen eine niedrigere Einkommenselastizität geschätzt wird
als für verheiratete Männer. Während die geringere Mobilität der unverheirateten
Töchter auf eine stärkere Humankapitaltransmission zwischen Vätern und Töchtern
im Vergleich zu den Söhnen zurückgeführt werden kann, ist die höhere Mobilität
verheirateter Frauen zum einen auf eine weniger starke Humankapitaltransmission
und zum anderen auf eine stärkere Arbeitsstundenelastizität der Töchter im Hin-
blick auf das Einkommen ihres Ehepartners zurückzuführen. Um den Eﬀekt der
assortativen Paarung genauer zu untersuchen, werden anschließend die verheirate-
ten Individuen noch einmal nach unterschiedlichen Einkommensarten untersucht.
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Dabei zeigt sich, dass die intergenerative Elastizität der Haushaltseinkommen ten-
denziell sogar größer ausfällt als die der Individualeinkommen, was für eine starke
assortative Paarung spricht. Betrachtet man die Höhe des Haushaltseinkommens als
das eigentliche Wohlstandsniveau einer Person, existieren außerdem keine gravie-
renden Unterschiede zwischen der Einkommensmobilität von Töchtern und Söhnen.
Auch das Individualeinkommen des jeweiligen Ehepartners ist stark mit dem Ein-
kommen des Vaters korreliert, was die These der assortativen Paarung wiederum
stützt. Die intergenerative Einkommenselastizität der Schwiegersöhne im Vergleich
zu ihren Schwiegervätern fällt in Deutschland sogar größer aus als die intergenerative
Einkommenselastizität der Söhne im Vergleich zu ihren eigenen Vätern.
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The inequality of market incomes has risen in almost all developed countries since
the 1970s. In Germany, the Gini coeﬃcient has increased from a local minimum of
0.38 in 1973 to a local maximum of 0.52 in 2014, while the Gini coeﬃcient in the
United States has risen from a local minimum of 0.42 in 1969 to a local maximum
of 0.51 in 2015 (Figure 1.1).
This development is driven by rapidly increasing incomes in the upper percentiles
of the earnings distribution and has been attributed mainly to the consequences of
globalization and technological progress. On the one hand, growing international
division of labor has led to an increase in the demand for high-skilled labor and
a decrease in the demand for low-skilled labor in developed countries (Ebenstein
et al., 2014). On the other hand, a growing number of manual tasks can today
be performed more eﬃciently by computers and robots, whereas complementary
cognitive tasks are in high demand (Autor et al., 2003). Both developments have
led to increasing wages for high-skilled workers and constant or even decreasing
wages for low-skilled workers, resulting in an increase in the inequality of market
incomes.
From a distributive point of view, an overly high level of income inequality
seems unfair to most people. Therefore, market incomes are usually redistributed
by the government, leading to signiﬁcantly lower inequality of disposable incomes.
However, fairness is a normative rather than an economic concept, and thus the
optimal amount of redistribution remains unclear to both economists and policy
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makers. In addition, a high level of redistribution is likely to create disincentives to
invest in physical and human capital and might therefore harm economic growth in
a society (Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-Sagalés, 2013).
Figure 1.1: Development of market and net income inequality
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However, even a high level of net income inequality is less problematic if it is
accompanied by a similarly high level of income mobility. To illustrate this, imagine
two societies, A and B. Society A is characterized by complete income immobility,
meaning that in each period, the income position of an individual is perfectly pre-
determined by their income position in the previous period. In contrast, society B
features complete income mobility, such that in each period, every individual has
an equal chance of receiving a high or low income irrespective of their income in
the previous period. In the latter case, society will be more likely to accept a high
level of inequality than in the ﬁrst case. If there exists a high level of income mo-
bility and thus economic success is directly dependent on talent, ability, and eﬀort,
2
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income diﬀerences might even encourage investments in education and an extension
of working hours.
A distinction is generally made between intra- and intergenerational mobility.
While intragenerational income mobility considers the extent to which an individual
can ascend or descend the income ladder within their own working life, intergener-
ational income mobility analyzes the ascent or descent of a child relative to their
parents' position in the income distribution. Intergenerational income mobility thus
examines the question of whether and to what extent the future income of a child
is predetermined by their family background, or, as Corak (2006) puts it: Do poor
children become poor adults? This issue is closely related to the analysis of equal-
ity of opportunity and has been the subject of a broad strand of the economic and
sociological literature for several decades. However, at least partly due to a lack of
data availability in most countries, numerous questions still remain unanswered.
The present dissertation deals with intergenerational income mobility in Ger-
many as compared to the United States and is intended to be a contribution to the
currently available literature. It consists of three parts, each of which addresses a
diﬀerent aspect of intergenerational income mobility. The overall focus is on an em-
pirical investigation using comparable data from the Socio-economic Panel (SOEP)
for Germany and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the United States.
A detailed description of the structure and the main results of this dissertation is
presented in Section 1.3.
1.2 Literature review
Intergenerational income mobility has been discussed in the economic literature since
the 1970s. Early studies include Sewell and Hauser (1975), Bielby and Hauser (1977),
and Behrman and Taubman (1985). However, the results of these ﬁrst studies
are likely to be systematically biased due to measurement errors and homogenous
samples. Beginning with the seminal contributions of Solon (1989, 1992), more
3
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recent decades have witnessed a rapid increase in the number of studies on the
transmission of income positions within families. A broad overview can, for example,
be found in Solon (1999), Björklund and Jäntti (2009), and Black and Devereux
(2011).
Figure 1.2: Country comparison of intergenerational income mobility
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Notes: DK: Denmark, SE: Sweden, NO: Norway, DE: Germany, AU: Australia, CA: Canada, FI:
Finland, GB: United Kingdom, FR: France, IT: Italy, US: United States.
Intergenerational income mobility is commonly estimated by the intergenera-
tional income elasticity, which measures the share of parents' income advantage or
disadvantage that is passed on to their children. Thus, higher values for the in-
tergenerational income elasticity imply a higher persistence of income positions and
thus a lower level of intergenerational income mobility. An international comparison
of the existing literature indicates that there are major diﬀerences among the results
for individual countries (Figure 1.2). Studies for the United States have ascertained
values ranging from 0.09 (Behrman and Taubman, 1985) to 0.61 (Mazumder, 2001).
Today the generally accepted value for the intergenerational income elasticity in the
4
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United States is 0.4 or higher (Corak, 2006). This places the United States at the
upper end of the estimated results and makes it a country with a rather low level of
intergenerational income mobility.
Similarly low levels of intergenerational income mobility are found in the liter-
ature for France and Italy. Lefranc and Trannoy (2005) determine an intergener-
ational income elasticity of approximately 0.4 for France. Meanwhile, estimates of
around 0.5 have been established for Italy (Mocetti, 2007, Piraino, 2007). For the
United Kingdom, the ascertained values of approximately 0.3 are somewhat lower
than those for the United States. However, they are still relatively high in the
international comparison (Blanden et al., 2004, Nicoletti and Ermisch, 2007).
In contrast, the Scandinavian countries exhibit very low levels of intergenera-
tional income persistence. The estimated elasticities for Finland (Pekkarinen et al.,
2009), Norway (Nilsen et al., 2008), and Sweden (Björklund and Jäntti, 1997, Björk-
lund et al., 2012) range from 0.2 to 0.3. Hussain et al. (2009) obtain a value of only
0.14 for Denmark. Australia and Canada also exhibit comparatively low values for
the intergenerational income elasticity and thus high levels of income mobility. Leigh
(2007) ﬁnds values ranging from 0.2 to 0.3 for Australia. For Canada, Corak and
Heisz (1999) compute a value of approximately 0.2.
Germany is usually classiﬁed between the United States and the Scandinavian
countries (Schnitzlein, 2016). Existing studies, however, calculate varying results
for the intergenerational income elasticity in Germany. The estimated values range
from 0.10 (Grawe, 2004) to 0.48 (Chau, 2012). However, the majority of studies ﬁnd
values of the order of approximately 0.2 to 0.3 (Vogel, 2006, Eisenhauer and Pfeif-
fer, 2008, Schnitzlein, 2009), indicating a level of intergenerational income mobility
similar to that of the Scandinavian countries. Surprisingly often, however, studies
conducting a direct comparison with comparable data ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between Germany and the United States (Couch and Dunn, 1997, Lillard, 2001,
Couch and Lillard, 2004, Schnitzlein, 2016). The relative position of Germany in
the international comparison is thus not clearly determined.
5
Introduction
1.3 Organization of this dissertation
This dissertation consists of three contributions. Each addresses one speciﬁc aspect
of intergenerational income mobility and is intended to be a stand-alone analysis.
All chapters use comparable data for Germany and the United States to conduct
country comparisons. As there are usually a large number of studies available for
the United States, this approach is useful for comparing the empirical results to the
existing literature. While the ﬁrst two studies are co-authored with Mustafa Çoban,
the third study is single-authored.
Structure and extent of intergenerational income mobility
Chapter 2 conducts a direct country comparison of the structure and extent of in-
tergenerational income mobility in Germany and the United States. In line with ex-
isting results, the estimated intergenerational income mobility of 0.49 in the United
States is signiﬁcantly higher than that of 0.31 in Germany. While the results for the
intergenerational rank mobility are relatively similar, the level of intergenerational
income share mobility is higher in the United States than in Germany. There are
no signiﬁcant indications of a nonlinear run of intergenerational income elasticity.
A ﬁnal decomposition of intergenerational income inequality shows both greater in-
come mobility and stronger progressive income growth for Germany compared to the
United States. Overall, we cannot identify a clear ranking of the two countries. To
conclude, several economic policy recommendations to increase intergenerational in-
come mobility in Germany are discussed. This chapter is co-authored with Mustafa
Çoban and has been published in a similar version in ORDO Yearbook of Economic
and Social Order, 67, 101-131.
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Transmission channels of intergenerational income persistence
Chapter 3 examines the transmission channels of intergenerational income persis-
tence in Germany and the United States. In principle, there are two ways in which
well-oﬀ families may inﬂuence the adult incomes of their children: ﬁrst through di-
rect investments in their children's human capital (investment eﬀect), and second
through the indirect transmission of human capital from parents to children (en-
dowment eﬀect). In order to disentangle these two eﬀects, a descriptive as well as
a structural decomposition method are utilized. The results suggest that the in-
vestment eﬀect and the endowment eﬀect each account for approximately half of
the estimated intergenerational income elasticity in Germany, while the investment
eﬀect is substantially more inﬂuential in the United States with a share of around
70 percent. With regard to economic policy, these results imply that equality of
opportunity for children born to poor parents cannot be reached by the supply of
ﬁnancial means alone. Conversely, an eﬃcient policy must additionally substitute
for the missing direct transmission of human capital within socio-economically weak
families. This chapter is again co-authored with Mustafa Çoban.
Intergenerational income mobility among daughters
Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation are restricted to the analysis of fathers and
their sons, whereas Chapter 4 explicitly focuses on the intergenerational income
mobility among daughters. The restriction to men is commonly made in the empir-
ical literature due to women's lower labor market participation. While most men
work full-time, the majority of (married) women still work only part-time or not at
all. Especially with the occurrence of assortative mating, daughters from well-oﬀ
families are likely to marry rich men and might decide to reduce their labor supply
as a result. Thus, the individual labor income of a daughter might not be a good
indicator for her actual economic status. The baseline regression analysis shows a
higher intergenerational income elasticity in Germany and a lower intergenerational
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income elasticity in the United States for women as compared to men. However,
a separation by marital status reveals that in both countries unmarried women ex-
hibit a higher intergenerational income elasticity than unmarried men, while married
women feature a lower intergenerational income elasticity than married men. The
reason for the lower mobility of unmarried women turns out to be a stronger human
capital transmission from fathers to daughters than to sons. The higher mobility
of married women is driven by a weaker human capital transmission and a higher
labor supply elasticity with respect to spousal income for women as compared to
men. In order to further study the eﬀects of assortative mating, the subsample of
married children is analyzed by diﬀerent types of income. It shows that the esti-
mated intergenerational income elasticity of children's household incomes is even
higher than that of their individual incomes. This can be seen as an indication for
strong assortative mating. If household income is interpreted as a measure of chil-
dren's actual economic welfare, there are barely any diﬀerences between sons and
daughters. The intergenerational income elasticity of spousal income with respect
to parental income is again relatively high, which in turn supports the hypothesis
of strong assortative mating. The elasticity of the sons-in-law with respect to their
fathers-in-law in Germany is even higher than that of the sons with respect to their
own fathers.
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Chapter 2
Structure and Extent of
Intergenerational Income Mobility∗
2.1 Introduction
The high level of income inequality is currently one of the most important socio-
political issues in both Germany and the United States. Closely related to income
inequality but less intensely discussed in public is the topic of income mobility. The
relationship between income inequality and income mobility can be illustrated with
the help of a simple image. If one imagines the interpersonal income distribution
as a ladder upon the rungs of which the respective income earners are located,
then income inequality determines the distance between the individual rungs. In
contrast, income mobility represents the probability of an individual to ascend or
descend from a particular rung on the ladder (Chetty et al., 2014).
Generally, one distinguishes between intra- and intergenerational income mo-
bility. While intragenerational income mobility considers the extent to which an
individual person can ascend or descend the income ladder within their own work-
ing life, intergenerational income mobility describes the ascent or descent of a child
relative to their parents' position on the income ladder. Intergenerational income
mobility thus examines the question of whether and to what extent the adult income
of a child is determined by their background. Put more simply: Do poor children
become poor adults and vice versa?
∗ This chapter is co-authored with Mustafa Çoban and has been published in a similar version
in Ordo Yearbook of Economic and Social Order, 67, 101131.
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A high level of intergenerational income mobility is desirable from both a dis-
tributive and an allocative point of view. On the one hand, society perceives it
as unfair when the income of a child is determined to a large extent by that of
their parents, and thus the future prospects of children from low-income families
are largely eliminated. On the other hand, if one assumes that initial abilities are
equally distributed among income classes, but children from low-income families are
unable to obtain well-paid employment reﬂective of their abilities, then society is
failing to use its resources in an eﬃcient manner (Schnitzlein, 2008).
However, high intergenerational income persistence cannot generally be inter-
preted as a lack of equal opportunity. Instead, children from wealthier households
may on average demonstrate a stronger preference for human capital investments
than children from poorer households. Reasons for this may be the intergenerational
transfer of aspirations, skills, and occupational choices within the family. Inequal-
ities that are driven by these determinants are accepted within a market economy
(Roemer, 2004). In contrast, high intergenerational income persistence is indicative
of a lack of equal opportunity if it is exogenously inﬂuenced by institutional condi-
tions, credit market constraints for poor households, or other social factors that are
beyond the control of the individual.
Intergenerational income mobility is commonly estimated by the intergenera-
tional income elasticity (Section 2.2.3), where, for example, a value of 0.3 means
that 30 percent of the income advantage or disadvantage of the parents is passed on
to their children. Thus, if a father's income is 10 percent higher than the average
income in the parents' generation, the expected income of his children is 3 percent
higher than the average income in the children's generation. Higher values for the
intergenerational income elasticity therefore imply a higher persistence of income
positions and thus a lower level of intergenerational income mobility. A comparison
of the existing literature on intergenerational income mobility shows that there are
considerable diﬀerences between individual countries (Solon, 1999, Björklund and
Jäntti, 2009, Black and Devereux, 2011). The consensus estimate for the intergen-
14
Structure and Extent of Intergenerational Income Mobility
erational income elasticity in the United States lies between 0.4 and 0.5 (Corak,
2006). Thus, in the international comparison, the United States is located at the
upper end of the ascertained values and is therefore a country with a rather low
level of intergenerational income mobility. The Scandinavian countries, in contrast,
exhibit very low levels of intergenerational income elasticity with values estimated
at around 0.2 (Nilsen et al., 2008, Hussain et al., 2009, Pekkarinen et al., 2009,
Björklund et al., 2012). Germany is generally classiﬁed between the United States
and the Scandinavian countries. The estimates obtained are of the order of approx-
imately 0.2 to 0.3 (Vogel, 2006, Eisenhauer and Pfeiﬀer, 2008, Schnitzlein, 2009).
However, Schnitzlein (2016) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the intergener-
ational income elasticities in Germany and the United States.
This chapter conducts a direct comparison of the structure and extent of inter-
generational income mobility in Germany and the United States. Consistent with
existing results, the intergenerational income elasticity in the United States is found
to be higher than in Germany. When comparing intergenerational rank mobility,
however, the results for the two countries are relatively similar. In terms of intergen-
erational income share mobility, greater diﬀerences exist between Germany and the
United States. With each higher percentile, the income share mobility of the sons
in the United States drops by a higher amount when compared to their fathers than
in Germany. For both countries, the results of the quantile regressions provide no
evidence of nonlinearities. The ﬁnal decomposition of intergenerational income in-
equality shows both greater income mobility and stronger progressive income growth
for Germany than for the United States. Section 2.2 subsequently describes the data
used and provides an overview of the various mobility measures. The results of the
estimates are presented in Section 2.3. Finally, Section 2.4 includes several economic
policy recommendations to increase intergenerational income mobility in Germany
and is followed by a brief summary in Section 2.5.
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2.2 Data and mobility measures
In order to examine intergenerational income mobility empirically, individual data
are required for at least two generations. Long-term panel surveys of households that
start capturing information on children while they are still living with their parents
and follow them into the older adult years are suitable for this purpose (Corak,
2006). In addition, in order to conduct a country comparison, it is necessary that
the data used are highly comparable regarding the survey design, the survey method,
and the survey period. In this study, we use the Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) for
Germany and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the United States.
Both records collect information on all adult persons of a household and survey
them repeatedly in the subsequent years. Thus, children who leave their parents'
homes and establish their own households can continue to be covered over time.
Both surveys are part of the Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF) project, which
oﬀers a harmonized panel data set of the underlying national household surveys
(Frick et al., 2007). In particular, it provides a reliable data basis for international
comparisons of income, taxes, and transfers. The individual annual labor income in
the CNEF used in this study includes wages and salaries from both paid employment
and self-employment as well as bonus payments, income from overtime, and proﬁt
sharing (Lillard, 2013, Grabka, 2014).
2.2.1 Measurement errors and life-cycle bias
In order to measure lifetime income, all of a respondent's income statements over
the entire working life would be required.1 In the case of an academic, for example,
income observations over the course of 35 to 40 years would need to be available
(Schnitzlein, 2009). However, with such a long survey period, the number of people
1 The lifetime income of a person generally includes both labor and capital income. Since in
surveys the collection of capital income is linked to problems, here the concept of income refers to
the labor income of a person.
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who continue to participate in the survey is reduced. This so-called panel mor-
tality can correlate with certain characteristics of the respondents (e.g., income or
education), resulting in a relatively homogeneous longitudinal sample (Fitzgerald
et al., 1998). This circumstance can lead to substantial distortions of the estimation
parameters (panel attrition bias) (Solon, 1989, 1992).
Therefore, lifetime incomes are approximated by means of annual income obser-
vations. These income statements consist of a permanent as well as a ﬂuctuating
component, where the second causes lifetime income to be determined with mea-
surement errors (Solon, 1989, 1992, Zimmerman, 1992). Thus, if parental income is
approximated by income data from only one particular point in time, the classical
errors-in-variables problem occurs (Wooldridge, 2010). This leads to a system-
atic downward bias of the estimated intergenerational income elasticity (attenuation
bias). Solon (1992) proposes to form an average of ﬁve valid annual income obser-
vations for the parental generation in order to reduce the variance of the ﬂuctuating
component. This procedure does not completely eliminate the bias, but it can sig-
niﬁcantly reduce it. Since the direction of the bias is known, an estimate of the
intergenerational income elasticity can be interpreted as a lower bound for the true
estimation parameter. In the approximation of children's lifetime income, measure-
ment errors only lead to higher standard errors.
In addition, Haider and Solon (2006) point out that the approximation of chil-
dren's lifetime income depends on the chosen stage of life. On the one hand, in-
dividual income during the working life assumes a hump-shaped run, so that the
income at the beginning of the working life is lower and thus the lifetime income of
a person is underestimated. On the other hand, diﬀerences in income between high-
and low-skilled workers are smaller at the beginning of their working lives and only
increase over time. If incomes are thus observed at the beginning of the working
life, this leads to an underestimation of intergenerational income elasticity (life-cycle
bias). This circumstance is veriﬁed by Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) for Sweden
and Brenner (2010) for Germany. For the United States, Haider and Solon (2006)
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show that for the sons, the age range between the mid-30s and the mid-40s produces
a good approximation of the lifetime income. Schnitzlein (2016) uses the income of
sons between 35 and 42 years of age for Germany.
2.2.2 Sample deﬁnition
The selected baseline samples from the SOEP and the PSID are deﬁned congruently
so as to ensure reliable comparability of the results. The analysis is based on data
from the years of 1984 to 2013. The individual annual labor income is used. We
exclude imputed income data from the SOEP sample.2 All income statements are
deﬂated to the year 2010.3 In order to be able to compare the results with the
existing literature, annual real incomes of less than 1,200 Euro/US dollar are not
included in the baseline samples. To avoid a bias due to wage developments in East
Germany after reuniﬁcation, the analysis for Germany is limited to the persons who
lived in West Germany in 1989 (Schnitzlein, 2009).
The generation of the parents is restricted to the income observations of the
fathers and the generation of the children to the income observation of the sons.4
Fathers' incomes are drawn from the period of 1984 to 1993, from which at least ﬁve
valid income observations must be available. The lifetime income of the fathers is
approximated by the formation of the average of the annual incomes. Only income
observations from the ages of 30 to 55 are considered. Thus, the fathers belong to
the birth cohorts of the period from 1933 to 1959. The income observations of the
sons are drawn from the years of 2003 to 2013, during which time period at least
one valid income observation must be available. Again, the lifetime income of the
2 Missing income statements are estimated in the SOEP with the help of personal and household
characteristics as well as past income data (Frick et al., 2012). The CNEF-PSID features no im-
puted income data.
3 For the SOEP, the Consumer Price Index and, for the PSID, the Consumer Price Index of
All Urban Consumers and All Items based on the recommendation of Grieger et al. (2009) are
utilized.
4 This limitation is due to the divergent labor market participation of women in both countries,
which can lead to a bias of diﬀerences in intergenerational income elasticity. While in the United
States female labor market participation was on average at 54.2 percent in the 1980s and at 59.5
percent in the 2000s, Germany features values of 41.4 percent and 50.8 percent, respectively (World
Bank, 2017).
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sons is approximated by the formation of the average of the annual incomes. Only
incomes from the age of 35 to 42 years are taken into account. Thus, the sons belong
to the birth cohorts from 1961 to 1978, which do not overlap with the cohorts of
their fathers.
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Fathers Sons
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
SOEP
Income 40,441.96 19,611.62 46,868.19 27,724.28
Age 46.84 4.53 38.13 1.80
Father-son pairs 354
PSID
Income 64,070.24 59,633.14 67,199.29 69,580.75
Age 43.76 5.42 37.89 1.88
Father-son pairs 601
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
A total of 354 father-son pairs are thus recorded in the SOEP and 601 father-son
pairs in the PSID (Table 2.1). On average, the sons earn more than their fathers
in both countries. The average income of the sons is 15.9 percent higher than the
average income of the fathers in Germany, while it is only 4.9 percent higher in the
United States. The average age of the fathers is mid-40s in both countries, older
than the sons, whose average age is late-30s. The younger age of the sons might also
determine the observed higher variance in incomes.
The logarithmized incomes of the fathers and sons exhibit a positive correlation
(Figure 2.1). The slope of the line of best ﬁt from the bivariate ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression is higher for the United States than for Germany. However, it also
becomes clear that the income data points in both countries are heavily scattered
around the regression line. In order to examine the simple linear relationship more
closely, the course of the bivariate Nadaraya-Watson (NW) estimation is additionally
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depicted. Both countries show deviations compared to the OLS estimation. How-
ever, the 95 percent conﬁdence intervals include the OLS regression line over nearly
the entire distribution of paternal income and deviations on the upper and lower
ends might be caused by inﬂuential outliers. Thus, it cannot be concluded from the
bivariate evidence that the intergenerational income elasticity changes signiﬁcantly
along the income distribution of the fathers.
Figure 2.1: Intergenerational income correlation
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Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: The Nadaraya-Watson estimation uses the Epanechnikov kernel with a range based on
Silverman's rule of thumb. OLS: Ordinary least squares, NW: Nadaraya-Watson.
2.2.3 Intergenerational mobility measures
Intergenerational income elasticity
The theoretical basis for the relationship between the income of parents and the
income of their children is expressed by the model of Becker and Tomes (1979,
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1986). The starting point is a family comprising two generations which maximizes
its utility by dividing its disposable income between consumption and investment
in the human capital of its children. Solon (2004) simpliﬁes this approach in order
to rationalize the intergenerational income elasticity usually estimated in empirical
studies by
log(ysi ) = β0 + β1 log(y
f
i ) + γx
′
i + ε
s
i . (2.1)
For each family i, the lifetime income of the son ysi and the lifetime income of
the father yfi are logarithmized. The intercept β0 can then be interpreted as the
average logarithmized lifetime income in the generation of the son, and the slope β1
is the searched-for intergenerational income elasticity. It states that an increase in
the father's lifetime income by 1 percent increases the son's lifetime income by an
average of β1 percent. If β1 = 0, the lifetime income of the son is independent of
the father's lifetime income and assumes the average value of the son's generation.
The higher the value of β1, the stronger the link between the lifetime income of
a father and his son is, and consequently, the lower the intergenerational income
mobility. If the variance of the logarithmized lifetime incomes of the fathers and
sons is approximately equal, β1 can also be interpreted as the correlation between the
logarithmized lifetime incomes of the two generations (Solon, 2004). In the selected
samples, the income observations of the sons and the fathers are sometimes measured
at diﬀerent times of their lives. Moreover, the number of valid observations varies
between respondents. Thus, the vector xi includes polynomials of the average age
of the father and the son, respectively, as well as the number of valid observations
of the son (Schnitzlein, 2016).5 Deviations from the predicted value due to factors
orthogonal to the income of the father are summarized in the idiosyncratic error
term εsi .
5 If the generation of the fathers and the generation of the sons exhibit diﬀerent age-income
proﬁles, the estimated intergenerational income elasticity might be biased (Fertig, 2003). How-
ever, the bootstrapped Hausman test for the intergenerational income elasticity with commonly
estimated age-income proﬁles and separately estimated age-income proﬁles yields no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence for Germany (p = 0.6460) and the United States (p = 0.1672), respectively.
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Intergenerational transition matrices
While the intergenerational income elasticity is a useful summary measure of relative
intergenerational mobility, it has some limitations. For example, it is not informative
regarding diﬀerences between upward and downward mobility and does not consider
nonlinearities along the income distribution (Bratberg et al., 2017). As a starting
point to overcome these issues, estimated transition matrices provide the possibility
of an illustrative representation. Here, the position of the son in the children's in-
come distribution is conditioned to the position of the father in the parents' income
distribution. More speciﬁcally, each cell cjk of the estimated transition matrix can
be interpreted as the probability that a son born to a father from quintile j reaches
quintile k. Again, the vector xi includes polynomials of the average age of the father
and the son as well as the number of valid observations of the son (Fertig, 2003).
cjk = P(q
s
i = k | qfi = j, xi), j, k = 1, ..., 5 (2.2)
Intergenerational transition matrices provide detailed information about the up-
ward and downward mobility at certain income quintiles. They thus supplement
the intergenerational income elasticity by determining to where sons from diﬀerent
backgrounds migrate within the income distribution.
Intergenerational rank mobility
Since estimated transition matrices cannot illustrate movements of the sons within
the respective quintiles, intergenerational rank mobility provides another way to
determine upward and downward mobility in more detail (Aaberge and Mogstad,
2014, Bratberg et al., 2017). Intergenerational rank mobility (RM) measures the
expected diﬀerence between the percentile of a son psi and the percentile of his
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father pfi conditioned to the percentile aﬃliation of the father:
RM(p) = E(psi − pfi | pfi = p), p = 1, ..., 100 (2.3)
It thus provides additional information on how the mobility of the sons varies along
the income distribution of the fathers (Bhattacharya and Mazumder, 2011, Chetty
et al., 2014, Mazumder, 2014). A further advantage of intergenerational rank mobil-
ity in comparison to intergenerational income elasticity is that it is relatively robust
to measurement issues and life-cycle bias (Nybom and Stuhler, 2016).6
Countries with similarly high levels of intergenerational income elasticity may ex-
hibit diﬀerent levels of intergenerational rank mobility if they diﬀer greatly in terms
of income inequality. This is due to the fact that for income recipients in countries
with higher income inequality, it is more diﬃcult to reach higher ranks, because the
absolute income limits of the percentiles are further apart from one another than
in a country with lower income inequality. Thus, combining intergenerational rank
mobility with income inequality allows further conclusions for a country comparison.
Intergenerational income share mobility
While intergenerational rank mobility measures relative positional movements, it
does not consider the distance between individual ranks in terms of absolute income
diﬀerences. In contrast, intergenerational income share mobility provides a hybrid
measure containing aspects of both absolute and relative mobility. In addition, it
also allows us to compare absolute income changes that are measured using diﬀerent
currencies (Bratberg et al., 2017).
Intergenerational income share mobility (IS) is deﬁned as the expected diﬀerence
between a child's income relative to their generation's average income and their
parents' income relative to the parental generation's average income conditioned to
6 According to Chetty et al. (2014), rank persistence stabilizes at the age of 30. Mazumder
(2014) shows that by the age of 40, the rank persistence in the PSID no longer exhibits a downward
bias. Thus, by limiting our sample, we meet both requirements.
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the percentile aﬃliation of the father:
IS(p) = E
(
ysi
E(ysi )
− y
f
i
E(yfi )
∣∣∣∣∣ pfi = p
)
, p = 1, ..., 100 (2.4)
As we use a balanced panel of families in each generation, this measure is equal
to the change in a family's share of their generation's total income scaled by the
population of the generation. The estimation of the intergenerational income rank
mobility and the intergenerational income share mobility is carried out with the aid
of nonparametric mobility curves with the respective OLS estimator being used as
a benchmark (Aaberge and Mogstad, 2014).
Quantile regressions
Until now, it has been assumed that the relationship between the logarithmized
income of fathers and their sons is linear, i.e., that the intergenerational income
elasticity is constant along the entire income distribution. However, Becker and
Tomes (1986) already pointed out that the intergenerational income relationship
can assume a concave run when poor families experience credit market constraints
that do not apply for rich families. Rich families will then invest in the human
capital of their children until the marginal costs equal the marginal rate of return.
Therefore, the expected relation between earnings of parents and children in rich
families depends solely on the expected relation between their endowments λ. In
contrast, credit-constrained families might be forced to invest less than the optimal
amount in their children's human capital. This means that a small increase in a
poor father's income will increase his child's income by more than λ. The intergen-
erational income persistence will then be more pronounced for poor families than
for rich families, creating a concave intergenerational earnings relationship (Figure
2.2.a).
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Figure 2.2: Nonlinearities in intergenerational income elasticity
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Source: Bratsberg et al. (2007).
However, a concave run of the intergenerational income elasticity neither needs
to follow from credit market constraints, nor is market failure implied by concavity.
If the income of a father correlates with the unobservable talent of his son, credit
market constraints do not necessarily imply a concave relationship. In this case,
poor fathersregardless of whether credit market constraints existwill reduce in-
vestments in the human capital of their sons as a result of a lower expected rate
of return. Likewise, a concave run is not a clear indication for credit market con-
straints. The relationship might be triggered by institutional, social, or unobservable
circumstances which inﬂuence poor and rich families in diﬀerent ways (Grawe, 2004).
On the other hand, a convex run of the intergenerational income elasticity can
be observed if educational policy is designed in such a way as to ensure a basic level
of human capital for all sons, regardless of their fathers' income. Then, particularly
at the bottom of the parents' earnings distribution, the slope of the regression line
is equal to λ. Beyond this socially guaranteed level, all families experience credit
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market constraints, such that the total amount of human capital investment in the
son is dependent on paternal income, i.e., the slope of the regression line is again
higher than λ (Bratsberg et al., 2007).7 Consequently, the intergenerational income
persistence among poor families will be lower than among rich families, resulting in
a convex run of the intergenerational income elasticity (Figure 2.2.b).
According to this reasoning, countries with a largely public education system
will likely exhibit a convex run of the intergenerational income elasticity, while
in countries with a high level of privatization of the education system, a concave
run is assumed. In 2013, the share of private spending in the German education
system amounted to 13.5 percent, whereas the United States exhibited a share of
31.8 percent (OECD, 2016). The curve of intergenerational income elasticity is thus
assumed to feature a rather convex run in Germany and a rather concave run in the
United States.
Decomposition of intergenerational income inequality
If the observed fathers and sons are interpreted as representatives of their respective
families at two diﬀerent points in time, income inequality and intergenerational
income mobility can be considered together. Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) provide
an analytical framework within which changes in income inequality G(ν) over time
can be additively decomposed into a progressivity component P(ν) and a mobility
component R(ν):
∆G(ν) = R(ν)− P(ν), (2.5)
where ν represents the inequality aversion of the society.8 While Jenkins and Van
Kerm (2006) utilize intragenerational income mobility to decompose income inequal-
ity, we transfer this method to intergenerational income mobility. We thus interpret
the progressivity component P(ν) as the change in income inequality when relative
7 This situation can be accounted for by the fact that the optimal human capital investment
of the fathers grows with the increasing talent of the sons (Han and Mulligan, 2001, Grawe and
Mulligan, 2002).
8 The conventional Gini coeﬃcient is obtained with ν = 2.
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incomes between families change, but all sons take on the respective income ranks of
their fathers. If income growth is more pronounced among the lower income quan-
tiles, i.e., income growth is progressive (pro-poor), P(ν) > 0 and therefore leads to a
reduction of income inequality. If, in contrast, income growth is concentrated among
the upper income quantiles, i.e., income growth is regressive (pro-rich), P(ν) < 0
and thus reinforces income inequality. In the same manner, the mobility component
R(ν) is interpreted as the change in income inequality when the income ranks of
the sons in comparison to those of their fathers change but the relative incomes of
the sons equal the relative incomes of their fathers. When there is no reranking,
R(ν) = 0, and otherwise, R(ν) > 0. Thus, for a given level of P(ν), a higher R(ν)
will lead to a rise in income inequality.
In conclusion, Equation (2.5) states that income inequality is reduced by pro-
gressive income growth unless more than oﬀset by concomitant income mobility.
These mutually compensatory eﬀects can also explain the paradox that increasing
income inequality is compatible with progressive income growth. If poor families
beneﬁt relatively more from income growth, they move upward within the income
distribution and the income gap between poor and rich families diminishes such that
the overall income inequality declines. However, some of the initially poor families
might not only be able to catch up relative to richer families, but also overtake some
of them. This situation counteracts the reduction in income inequality.
2.3 Empirical results
2.3.1 Descriptive evidence
Comparing income inequality in the fathers' and the sons' generations in Germany
and the United States, respectively, it can be observed that the Gini coeﬃcient is
lower in Germany in both generations but has increased in both countries over time
(Table 2.2). While in the United States income inequality rose by 7.84 Gini points
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(23.42 percent) from an initial value of 33.48 Gini points to a ﬁnal value of 41.32
Gini points, it increased by 9.11 Gini points (42.49 percent) from an initial value of
21.44 Gini points to a ﬁnal value of 30.55 Gini points in Germany. Thus, the level of
income inequality has increased more sharply in Germany both in terms of absolute
and relative values.
Table 2.2: Income inequality
Generation of the fathers Generation of the sons
(1984-1993) (2003-2013)
Germany 21.44 30.55
United States 33.48 41.32
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: Income inequality is estimated based on unweighted samples. A comparison with
weighted values shows that the eﬀects of panel mortality and selection bias are minor. The de-
marcations from Section 2.2.2 were applied, but the sample was not limited to father-son pairs.
Figure 2.3 shows that there were both winners and losers as a result of this devel-
opment. The quantile curves for Germany and the United States show the share of
the total income covered by the respective percentile of the income distribution (left
partial ﬁgure). Percentiles with values smaller than one claim a disproportionately
low share of the total income for themselves, while percentiles with values greater
than one claim a disproportionately high share. The income share curves assume
a slightly s-shaped run in Germany, while the United States exhibits rather convex
curves. In Germany, fathers from the 65th and sons from the 62nd percentile on
possess a disproportionate share of total income, while in the United States fathers
from the 61st and sons from the 67th percentile on receive a disproportionate share
of total income. Thus, the two countries do not diﬀer much with regard to the
proportionality limit. However, the empirical picture changes when considering the
top income percentile. The top 1 percent of income earners in Germany receive 3.7
percent of the total income in the fathers' generation and 4.8 percent in the sons'
generation, while in the United States these values are found to be 6.0 percent for
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the fathers and 9.1 percent for the sons.9 The quantile curves of the two generations
intersect at the 53rd percentile in Germany and at the 83rd percentile in the United
States. This means that in Germany, just over half of the sons' generation is poorer
compared to their fathers' generation. In the United States, this share reaches four-
ﬁfths of the sons' generation (right partial ﬁgure). Measured in percentage points,
the lower percentiles of the sons' generation must accept greater losses in Germany
than in the United States. The percentile with the greatest loss in Germany loses
0.32 percentage points (66.65 percent) in comparison to the percentile of the fathers'
generation, while the maximum loss in the United States is 0.12 percentage points
(43.42 percent). Thus, on the one hand, the drop at the lower end of the income
distribution in Germany is stronger than in the United States. On the other hand,
the share of losers in the total population in the United States is greater than in
Germany.
9 The analysis of the top incomes in the SOEP and the PSID should be treated with caution,
since high-income earners are systematically less likely to provide information about their income.
The values can thus be biased downwards and are to be regarded as a lower limit for the true
parameter.
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Figure 2.3: Income share curves
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Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: Conﬁdence intervals were calculated using paired bootstrap resampling with 1,000 repli-
cations.
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2.3.2 Intergenerational income elasticity
If the samples of the two countries are limited to the observed father-son pairs, the
simple intergenerational income elasticity can be determined using OLS estimations
(Table 2.3).
Table 2.3: Intergenerational income elasticity
Germany United States
Dependent variable: Log. income (son)
Log. income (father) 0.3114*** 0.3180*** 0.4929*** 0.4639***
(0.0801) (0.0777) (0.0722) (0.0723)
Age (son) 0.3025 -1.2207
(1.2841) (1.2906)
Age2 (son) -0.0039 0.0163
(0.0167) (0.0168)
Age (father) -0.0347 0.0208
(0.1258) (0.1070)
Age2 (father) 0.0005 -0.0002
(0.0014) (0.0012)
Observations (son) 0.0291 0.1336**
(0.0280) (0.0544)
Observations 354 354 601 601
R2 0.0448 0.0722 0.1080 0.1397
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: Estimations for the SOEP are based on non-imputed income data. The intergenerational
income elasticities have been determined for an annual lower income limit of 1,200 Euro/US dol-
lar. Standard errors are clustered at the family level and were calculated using paired bootstrap
resampling with 1,000 replications. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
For Germany, a value of 0.3114 is obtained, while in the United States, the
value is 0.4929. According to this, 31 percent of the father's income advantage or
disadvantage is passed on to his son in Germany and 49 percent of the father's income
advantage or disadvantage is passed on to his son in the United States. Including
polynomials of the average age of the father and the son as well as the number
of valid observations of the son, the estimates change only slightly. Therefore, we
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can assume that the selected age limits are chosen correctly. Thus, at ﬁrst glance,
intergenerational income elasticity is higher in the United States than in Germany.
Table 2.4: Intergenerational income elasticity for diﬀerent lower income limits
Germany United States
Without imputed With imputed
income data income data
Income > 1,200 Euro/US dollar
IIE 0.3180*** 0.2889*** 0.4639***
(0.0777) (0.0809) (0.0723)
Observations 354 392 601
R2 0.0722 0.0743 0.1397
Income > 6,000 Euro/US dollar
IIE 0.3238*** 0.3360*** 0.4600***
(0.0711) (0.0739) (0.0622)
Observations 348 387 583
R2 0.1032 0.1199 0.1688
Income > 12,000 Euro/US dollar
IIE 0.3591*** 0.3666*** 0.4187***
(0.0704) (0.0667) (0.0606)
Observations 337 376 557
R2 0.1299 0.1515 0.1533
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: Other control variables include polynomials of the father's and the son's age as well as
the number of valid observations of the son. Standard errors are clustered at the family level
and were calculated using paired bootstrap resampling with 1,000 replications. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. IIE: Intergenerational income elasticity.
The baseline estimations include observations with earned incomes of at least
1,200 Euro/US dollar per year. However, such a low income is not suﬃcient for the
survival of a single individual in either country without additional income sources
or social transfers. Thus, the estimates are repeated for lower income limits of 6,000
Euro/US dollar and 12,000 Euro/US dollar per year (Table 2.4). For Germany,
the estimates were conducted both with and without imputed income data. The
two countries show diﬀerent developments of intergenerational income elasticity.
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The intergenerational income elasticity in the United States decreases with a rising
lower income limit from an estimated value of 0.4639 to an estimated value of 0.4187.
The intergenerational income elasticity in Germany increases from 0.3180 to 0.3591
without imputed incomes and from 0.2889 to 0.3666 with imputed incomes. Thus,
the gap between the United States and Germany is shortened by an increase in the
income limit, even though the United States exhibits higher intergenerational income
elasticities across all lower income limits. Since with a rising lower income limit, an
increasingly larger piece is cut oﬀ at the left-hand side of the income distribution,
the estimates provide evidence that the intergenerational income elasticity might
diﬀer along the income distribution.10
2.3.3 Intergenerational rank and income share mobility
As a starting point, estimated transition matrices oﬀer the possibility to further
examine intergenerational income mobility by providing information about nonlin-
earities along the income distribution and diﬀerences between upward and downward
mobility. Here, the position of the son in the children's income distribution is con-
ditioned to the position of his father in the parents' income distribution. More
speciﬁcally, each value indicates the probability of a son to reach a certain quintile
depending on his father's quintile aﬃliation. Thus, in a completely mobile society,
all cells should assume a value of 0.2. The income position of the son is then inde-
pendent of the income position of his father. In a completely immobile society, on
the other hand, the main diagonal assumes a value of one with a value of zero being
assigned to all remaining cells. In this case, the income position of the son can be
perfectly predicted from the income position of his father.
10 Considering the birth cohorts of the fathers and sons as well as including periods of unem-
ployment, we ﬁnd no major diﬀerences in the intergenerational income elasticity in Germany and
the United States after accounting for inﬂuential observations according to Belsley et al. (1980)
(see Table 2.8 in the Appendix).
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Table 2.5: Estimated transition matrices
Germany
Income quintile (son)
Income quintile (father) 1 2 3 4 5
1 27.31 24.52 21.87 16.19 10.11
2 26.53 24.31 22.08 16.59 10.48
3 15.28 18.88 23.24 23.52 19.08
4 11.57 15.85 22.11 25.95 24.51
5 7.66 11.73 19.13 27.70 33.78
United States
Income quintile (son)
Income quintile (father) 1 2 3 4 5
1 39.16 21.79 18.33 11.49 9.23
2 27.89 20.52 21.26 15.82 14.51
3 17.12 16.30 21.70 20.74 24.14
4 13.20 13.81 20.52 22.31 30.15
5 8.29 9.77 17.02 22.92 42.01
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: The income positions of fathers and sons are based on the unweighted income distribu-
tion of their respective generation. Other control variables include polynomials of the father's
and the son's age as well as the number of valid observations of the son.
Along the main diagonal, the results for Germany and the United States diﬀer
strongly from one another only in the lowest and the highest quintiles (Table 2.5).11
In the United States, the probability of a son whose father is located in the lowest
quintile remaining in that quintile is 39.16 percent, whereas the probability is 27.31
percent in Germany. Likewise, the probability of a son whose father is located in the
highest quintile remaining in that quintile is 42.01 percent in the United States and
33.78 percent in Germany, respectively. However, the upward mobility of sons from
the higher quintiles is more pronounced in the United States. Consequently, the
downward mobility of sons from the higher quintiles is slightly higher in Germany.
Overall, intergenerational persistence at the bottom and the top of the income dis-
11 Since income quintiles are an ordinal variable, the transition probabilities of the sons are
estimated using ordered logistic regressions (Fertig, 2003, Schnitzlein, 2009). Subsequently, the
estimated transition probabilities are averaged over the entire sample.
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tribution appears to be stronger in the United States than in Germany, although
the diﬀerences are not very pronounced.
Figure 2.4: Intergenerational rank mobility
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Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: The Nadaraya-Watson estimation uses the Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth ac-
cording to Silverman's rule of thumb. OLS: Ordinary least squares, NW: Nadaraya-Watson.
The analysis of intergenerational mobility curves reﬁnes the picture of upward
and downward mobility along the income distribution. The intergenerational rank
mobility measures by how many percentiles the son is expected to ascend or de-
scend dependent on the income position of his father. The estimated curves show
a negative slope in both countries, with an OLS estimate of -0.7167 for Germany
and -0.5873 for the United States (Figure 2.4). Thus, if the father's income posi-
tion increases by one percentile, the absolute rank mobility of the son is reduced by
0.72 percentiles in Germany and 0.59 percentiles in the United States. Sons whose
fathers rank in the lowest ﬁve percentiles ascend on average by 33-36 percentiles in
Germany and by 28-30 percentiles in the United States. Sons whose fathers rank in
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the highest ﬁve percentiles descend on average by 32-35 percentiles in Germany and
by 25-28 percentiles in the United States. Thus, the upward and downward mobility
of the sons located at the bottom and the top of the paternal income distribution is
again more pronounced in Germany than in the United States. Comparing the OLS
estimates with the results of the Bin estimation and the Nadaraya-Watson estima-
tion, it can be concluded for both countries that there is no evidence of nonlinearities
in the development of intergenerational rank mobility along the income distribution
of the fathers.
Figure 2.5: Intergenerational income share mobility
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Notes: The Nadaraya-Watson estimation uses the Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth ac-
cording to Silverman's rule of thumb. OLS: Ordinary least squares, NW: Nadaraya-Watson.
In contrast, the intergenerational income share mobility measures the expected
change in a family's share of the total income over two generations dependent on
the income position of the father.12 Similar to the ﬁnding of mean reversion in
12 Incomes of sons with the same father were averaged to ensure a family comparison.
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ranks, there is also mean reversion in income shares. Families that start at higher
percentiles in the income distribution experience a smaller increase in income share
than families that start at lower percentiles. The OLS estimation yields values of
-0.0091 in Germany and -0.0121 in the United States, respectively (Figure 2.5).
Thus, if the father's income position increases by one percentile, the income share
mobility of the son is reduced by 0.0091 percentage points in Germany and 0.0121
percentage points in the United States. The income share of the sons whose fathers
rank in the lowest ﬁve percentiles increases on average by 0.38-0.42 percentage points
in Germany and by 0.58-0.62 percentage points in the United States. The income
share of the sons whose fathers rank in the highest ﬁve percentiles decreases on
average by 0.45-0.49 percentage points in Germany and 0.53-0.57 percentage points
in the United States. However, the income drop in the United States is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. Therefore, regarding intergenerational income share mobility, the
United States is more mobile than Germany. Unlike intergenerational rank mobility,
intergenerational income share mobility tends to exhibit nonlinearities in Germany.
In particular, the sons located at the top of the paternal income distribution experi-
ence an abrupt reduction in income share. Thus, the empirical picture suggests that
the OLS estimator actually overestimates intergenerational income share mobility
due to outliers at the upper end of the fathers' income distribution.
2.3.4 Quantile regressions
For a valid assessment of nonlinearities in the relationship between the incomes of
fathers and sons, estimates along the income distribution of the sons are necessary.13
For this purpose, the intergenerational income elasticity is estimated using condi-
tional and unconditional quantile regressions at selected percentiles of the income
distribution of the sons (Table 2.6).
13 The empirical picture is mixed for both Germany and the United States. Lillard (2001) and
Couch and Lillard (2004) ﬁnd evidence of a nonlinear run of intergenerational income elasticity for
both countries. Bratsberg et al. (2007) determine a more or less linear relationship for the United
States. Schnitzlein (2009, 2016) also ﬁnds no signiﬁcant diﬀerence along the conditional income
distribution in Germany.
37
Structure and Extent of Intergenerational Income Mobility
Table 2.6: Quantile regressions
Germany United States
CQR UQR CQR UQR
20th percentile
IIE 0.3114*** 0.2483** 0.4493*** 0.4268***
(0.1036) (0.1034) (0.0868) (0.1044)
Pseudo R2 0.0476 0.0351 0.0701 0.0583
40th percentile
IIE 0.3270*** 0.4178*** 0.3923*** 0.3765***
(0.0891) (0.0862) (0.0908) (0.0702)
Pseudo R2 0.0623 0.1049 0.0634 0.0925
50th percentile
IIE 0.3586*** 0.4093*** 0.3613*** 0.3935***
(0.0968) (0.0809) (0.0798) (0.0657)
Pseudo R2 0.0719 0.1221 0.0665 0.1067
60th percentile
IIE 0.4173*** 0.4068*** 0.3881*** 0.4000***
(0.0934) (0.0876) (0.0614) (0.0666)
Pseudo R2 0.0731 0.1132 0.0737 0.0961
80th percentile
IIE 0.3782*** 0.4420*** 0.5101*** 0.4782***
(0.0716) (0.1106) (0.0707) (0.0926)
Pseudo R2 0.0856 0.0768 0.0883 0.0924
Observations 354 354 601 601
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: Other control variables include polynomials of the father's and the son's age as well as
the number of valid observations of the son. Standard errors are clustered at the family level
and were calculated using paired bootstrap resampling with 1,000 replications. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. IIE: Intergenerational income elasticity, CQR: Conditional quantile
regression, UQR: Unconditional quantile regression.
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Figure 2.6: Conditional quantile regressions
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Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the family level and were calculated using paired boot-
strap resampling with 1,000 replications. CQR: Conditional quantile regression, OLS: Ordinary
least squares.
The conditional quantile regressions show a slightly hump-shaped run for Ger-
many and a u-shaped curve for the United States over the conditional income quan-
tiles of the sons.14 Using conditional quantile regressions, however, statements about
a nonlinear run of the intergenerational income elasticity can only be made when
the monotonicity of the estimation parameter along the income distribution is un-
ambiguous.15 Likewise, for both Germany and the United States, the 95 percent
conﬁdence interval completely covers the OLS estimator of intergenerational income
elasticity (Figure 2.6). Thus, neither a concave nor a convex run of the intergener-
ational income elasticity in Germany and the United States can be veriﬁed.
14 The conditional quantile regression deﬁnes the income quantile of the son conditional on
the income of his father and estimates the intergenerational income elasticity on the conditional
quantile of the income distribution of the son (Koenker and Bassett, 1978, Koenker, 2005).
15 Simple Wald tests show that the estimates do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across the percentiles
either for Germany (p = 0.7857) or for the United States (p = 0.1793).
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Figure 2.7: Unconditional quantile regressions
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Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the family level and were calculated using paired boot-
strap resampling with 1,000 replications. UQR: Unconditional quantile regression, OLS: Ordi-
nary least squares.
Using conditional quantile regressions, insights into how strong the eﬀect of
parental income is for the sons at the selected quantile of the marginal income distri-
bution cannot be obtained. For such questions, the unconditional quantile regression
or RIF regression is suitable (Firpo et al., 2009). In Germany, the intergenerational
income elasticity assumes an s-shaped curve along the ascending quantiles. Between
the 40th and the 60th percentile, it is relatively constant at about 0.4, whereas it
is lower for the 20th percentile and higher for the 80th percentile. The intergenera-
tional income mobility is therefore higher at the lower end of the income distribution
of the sons and slightly decreases when moving upward through the quantiles. In
the United States, the development of the estimation parameters across the quan-
tiles takes on a slightly u-shaped form. According to this, intergenerational income
mobility is higher in the middle range of the income distribution of the sons than at
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the lower and upper end of the income distribution. While the curve for Germany
indicates a convex development, the United States displays an initially concave and
then a convex course. However, the deviations from proportionality must be inter-
preted with caution since the conﬁdence bands for both countries are relatively large
and always contain the respective OLS estimator (Figure 2.7). Overall, the results
of the conditional and unconditional quantile regressions provide no clear indication
of nonlinearities in the development of intergenerational income elasticity over the
income distribution of the sons either for Germany or for the United States.
2.3.5 Decomposition of intergenerational income inequality
Viewing the fathers and the sons as representatives of their families at diﬀerent
points in time, the income inequality between families for two generations can be
measured.16 In Germany, income inequality has risen by 3.11 Gini points (13.54
percent) from an initial value of 22.94 Gini points to a ﬁnal value of 26.05 Gini
points. In the United States, income inequality has increased by 7.35 Gini points
(21.98 percent) from an initial value of 33.43 Gini points to a ﬁnal value of 40.77
Gini points (Table 2.7).17 Thus, in both countries, income inequality has increased
over time, but the increase was stronger in the United States than in Germany.
In principle, the smaller rise in income inequality in Germany could reﬂect a
pattern of either progressive income growth being oﬀset by signiﬁcant reranking
or simply fewer changes overall. Our results show that the former was the case:
income growth was more pro-poor in Germany than in the United States. The
decomposition according to Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) shows that progressive
income growth has reduced income inequality by 14.71 Gini points (64.14 percent)
in Germany and by 15.43 Gini points (46.16 percent) in the United States. Thus,
in the case of unchanged income positions of the families in the second generation,
16 Since a father can have several economically active sons, the incomes of the sons of a family
were averaged in the calculations.
17 Note that the obtained Gini coeﬃcients diﬀer from those presented in Section 2.3.1 because
in-sample rather than overall observations are used.
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there should have been a strong reduction in income inequality. However, income
mobility in both countries overcompensates for progressive income growth, such
that income inequality between families ultimately increases. In Germany, income
mobility raises income inequality by 17.82 Gini points (77.68 percent), whereas in the
United States, income inequality is increased by 22.78 Gini points (68.14 percent).
Thus, Germany exhibits both more progressive income growth and higher income
mobility as measured by percentage of the initial Gini coeﬃcients in comparison to
the United States.
Table 2.7: Decomposition of intergenerational income inequality
Germany United States
Initial Gini of the fathers 22.94 33.43
Final Gini of the sons 26.05 40.77
Sizes in Gini points
∆ Gini 3.11 7.35
Mobility 17.82 22.78
Progressive income growth 14.71 15.43
Sizes in percent of initial Gini
∆ Gini 13.54 21.98
Mobility 77.68 68.14
Progressive income growth 64.14 46.16
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
2.4 Recommendations for economic policy
Our results suggest that paternal income has a strong inﬂuence on the future in-
come of the sons both in Germany and the United States. Although there are no
indications of nonlinearities which might be caused by credit market constraints,
the substantially lower intergenerational income elasticity in, e.g., the Scandinavian
countries indicates the additional inﬂuence of exogenous determinants on the success
of children from poor households. Thus, measures to mitigate these exogenous in-
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ﬂuences can reduce intergenerational income elasticity and facilitate a more eﬃcient
use of the human capital in society.
However, stronger redistribution of income via the tax and transfer system does
not necessarily have a positive eﬀect on the level of social mobility. Although the
disposable incomes of poor and rich families converge as a result of more redistri-
bution, a more progressive tax and transfer system leads to a declining return to
human capital in the labor market, and thus to a reduction in the incentive to invest
in education. While this is true for all families, it aﬀects poor households relatively
more strongly than it does rich households. In sum, a higher level of redistribu-
tion could even reduce intergenerational income mobility. The method of choice
should therefore be an improvement in the institutional design of the preschool and
school system to increase equality of opportunity without severe distortion of market
processes.
Early childhood education
The barriers to the later income of relatively poor children are not found in the late
stages of education, but rather in early childhood care. Stimulation that children
experience in the early stages of brain development greatly inﬂuences the limits
of future mental capability. A stimulating environment thus results in improved
cognitive development, better social skills, and better health (Knudsen et al., 2006).
While children whose families have above-average incomes and human capital
are able to receive this stimulation at home, this support often falls by the way-
side in less well-oﬀ families. Lee and Burkam (2002) show that there are already
severe diﬀerences in education between children from diﬀerent social backgrounds
at the beginning of preschool. As these diﬀerences are expected to grow over the
course of the children's education, this means that early childhood care is of great
importance. Thus, for children from socio-economically weak households, incen-
tives and opportunities must be created for their earlier attendance of public or
private childcare facilities where they can be supported according to their abilities.
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This particularly applies to those children with an immigration background who
ﬁrst come into contact with the German language at day care centers or in kinder-
garten. In 2016, however, only 21 percent of children under 3 years of age with
a migrant background visited day care, while 38 percent of under-3-year-olds with
no migration background did so (Federal Statistical Oﬃce, 2017). An expansion
of childcare facilities especially for children under 3 years of age as well as a good
staﬀ-to-student ratio with well-trained educators would therefore be conductive to
higher intergenerational income mobility. The German Betreuungsgeld, a childcare
subsidy for parents who raise their under-3-year-olds at home, is obviously not.
Desegregation
Another starting point is the pronounced segregation of children according to their
social background. This problem is particularly evident in the strong heterogeneity
of the quality of schools in Germany. The variation in the 2009 PISA scores between
schools is 68 percent, which is well above the average of 42 percent for the OECD
countries. At the same time, the variance in the results within the individual schools
is only 45 percent, which is considerably below the OECD average of 65 percent
(OECD, 2012). Thus, pupils at the respective schools are at a comparable level,
while the variation between the performance of pupils in good and bad schools is
substantial.
Musset (2012) illustrates that a large part of educational segregation can be
traced back to local segregation. On the one hand, families with a lower educational
level spend less time choosing a school for their children and often suﬀer from a con-
siderable information deﬁcit with regard to the educational system and the quality
of schools (Hastings et al., 2005). Thus, families with a weaker socio-economic sta-
tus tend to send children to the locally nearest school, while wealthy families choose
the subjectively best school for their children and tend to avoid schools with a high
number of children from socially vulnerable families (Schneider and Buckley, 2002,
Raveaud and Zanten, 2007). On the other hand, a strong variation in school quality
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means that the demand for spots at good schools exceeds the existing capacities. In
such cases, the risk of so-called cream skimming, i.e., the selection of subjectively
better pupils, is high (Lubienski, 2006). Here, the location of children's homes is
an indicator of their social background, which can be used by schools as a basis
for the selection of pupils. Thus, if cities become increasingly segregated by social
background, this intensiﬁes the problem of intergenerational income persistence.
To increase intergenerational income mobility, investments in the education sys-
tem must therefore primarily promote equal opportunity and desegregation. A sim-
ple enhancement in educational spending is not an adequate means of increasing
social mobility: the higher the average level of human capital, the more diﬃcult the
process of catching up is for pupils from disadvantaged families (Hanushek, 2003).
A so-called formula funding based on the Dutch model could help to decrease cream
skimming and reduce the segregation of children according to social status. Here, a
weight is assigned to each student and the ﬁnancial resources allocated to a certain
school are calculated based on the sum of the weights of its students. If pupils
from disadvantaged families are assigned a higher weight, there is an incentive for
schools to accept these pupils. This also takes account of the fact that due to the
more intensive support they require, the admission of disadvantaged children may
be more cost-intensive in some circumstances.
Secondary school tracking
Another issue often discussed in politics is the division of pupils into various sec-
ondary school tracks after only four years of elementary school in Germany. Thus,
while the median age of ﬁrst formal selection is 15 years in the OECD countries,
selection in Germany takes place when students are only 10 years old (OECD, 2012).
As a consequence, the decision as to whether a child apprentices to learn a trade
or attends university is made very early in most cases. However, children's level
of education is one of the most important determinants for their adult income and
heavily inﬂuences the probability of becoming unemployed during their working life.
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In 2015, the unemployment rate of persons aged between 15 and 74 who earned a de-
gree below the secondary education level was 11.2 percent in Germany. In contrast,
the possession of a secondary (4.3 percent) or tertiary education level (2.3 percent)
leads to a signiﬁcantly lower probability of unemployment (European Commission,
2017).
However, the decision to attend a particular type of secondary school depends
heavily on the education level of the parents. While 43.8 percent of the parents of
children at the German Hauptschule also attended this institution, only 7.2 percent
of the parents of pupils at the Gymnasium did so. Similarly, 62.5 percent of the
parents of children at the Gymnasium achieved a high school diploma, while only
14.5 percent of the parents of children at the Hauptschule have (Federal Statistical
Oﬃce, 2017). Therefore, later secondary school tracking, e.g., at the age of 12
instead of 10, as a measure to support equality in the schooling system has been
discussed for some time. A similar school reform in Finland has led to a reduction of
intergenerational income elasticity by 23 percent (Pekkarinen et al., 2009). Hanushek
and Wößmann (2006) conﬁrm that early tracking is associated with a signiﬁcantly
larger inequality of performance between pupils, while there are no signiﬁcant eﬀects
on the overall performance. In contexts where there is reluctance to delay early
tracking in the short term, the negative eﬀects could be lessened by an improvement
of the selection methods for the diﬀerent tracks, a limitation of grouping to speciﬁc
subjects, and an increase in the ﬂexibility to change tracks.
2.5 Conclusion
The present study examines the structure and extent of intergenerational income
mobility in Germany and the United States with the help of diﬀerent statistical
concepts. In line with existing results, intergenerational income elasticity in the
United States is higher than in Germany. While the results for intergenerational
rank mobility are relatively similar, the level of intergenerational income share mo-
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bility is higher in the United States than in Germany. There are no indications
of a nonlinear run of the intergenerational income elasticity. The decomposition of
intergenerational income inequality shows both higher income mobility and stronger
progressive income growth for Germany compared to the United States. Overall, we
cannot identify a clear ranking of the two countries. In order to increase the level of
social mobility, policy needs to focus on equality of opportunity in the educational
system. This solution is more incentive-compatible in the long run than a policy of
pure redistribution.
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Appendix
Table 2.8: Intergenerational income elasticity (robustness checks)
Germany United States
Without
unemployment
periods
With
unemployment
periods
Without
unemployment
periods
With
unemployment
periods
Dependent variable: Log. income (son)
Log. income (father) 0.3428*** 0.3283*** 0.4613*** 0.4433***
(0.0776) (0.0790) (0.0731) (0.0657)
Age (son) -0.0747 1.1732 -1.3013 0.6606
(1.2985) (1.1114) (1.2942) (1.0109)
Age2 (son) 0.0003 -0.0157 0.0175 -0.0087
(0.0168) (0.0143) (0.0169) (0.0132)
Age (father) -0.0729 -0.0151 0.0317 0.0354
(0.1365) (0.1310) (0.1081) (0.0975)
Age2 (father) 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0003
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Observations (son) 0.0437 0.0047 0.1368** -0.0114
(0.0297) (0.0238) (0.0539) (0.0450)
Birth cohort (son) -0.0296* -0.0230 0.0063 -0.0166
(0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0187) (0.0156)
Birth cohort (father) -0.0436 -0.0433 0.0236 0.04944
(0.0479) (0.0465) (0.0547) (0.0495)
Observations 354 353 601 597
R2 0.0847 0.0788 0.1402 0.1222
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: Estimations for the SOEP are based on non-imputed income data. The intergenerational
income elasticities have been determined for an annual lower income limit of 1,200 Euro/US dol-
lar. Standard errors are clustered at the family level and were calculated using paired bootstrap
resampling with 1,000 replications. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Chapter 3
Transmission Channels of
Intergenerational Income
Persistence†
3.1 Introduction
Intergenerational income persistencethe fact that children from rich families tend
to have higher adult incomes themselves than children from poor familieshas been
extensively discussed in the economic literature since the 1980s.18 A wide range
of studies analyze the extent of intergenerational income persistence (Solon, 1992,
Björklund and Jäntti, 1997, Schnitzlein, 2016), the development of intergenerational
income persistence over time (Fertig, 2003, Lee and Solon, 2009, Chetty et al., 2014),
and diﬀerences in the intergenerational income persistence between individual coun-
tries (Corak, 2006, Corak et al., 2014, Bratberg et al., 2017). The measure commonly
estimated in order to quantify intergenerational income persistence is the intergener-
ational income elasticity, where, for example, a value of 0.3 means that 30 percent of
the parents' income advantage or disadvantage is passed on to their children. Thus,
if a family's income is 10 percent higher than the average income in the parental gen-
eration, the expected income of their children is 3 percent higher than the average
income in the ﬁlial generation.19
† This chapter is co-authored with Mustafa Çoban.
18 For a broad literature review, see Solon (1999), Björklund and Jäntti (2009), and Black and
Devereux (2011).
19 The intergenerational income elasticity is described in detail in Section 3.2.1.
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Figure 3.1: Transmission channels of intergenerational income persistence
higher human capital
of the father
higher income
of the father
higher human capital
of the son
higher income
of the son
So far, however, little is known about the underlying transmission channels of
intergenerational income persistence. Why exactly do children born to wealthy fam-
ilies earn more than less fortunate children? Essentially, there are two conceivable
mechanisms (Figure 3.1). On the one hand, well-oﬀ families can use their ﬁnancial
resources to invest in the education of their oﬀspring, which is then reﬂected in their
children's higher human capital and thus higher income in adulthood (investment
eﬀect). This includes, for example, the attendance of private schools and universi-
ties as well as additional private lessons, which might not be aﬀordable for children
from poor families. On the other hand, if the higher parental income is at least
partially determined by a higher parental human capital, more auent families may
in addition directly pass on this human capital to their children (endowment eﬀect).
Possible examples are the genetic transmission of certain traits, the intergenera-
tional transfer of aspirations and skills, and at-home nonﬁnancial investments such
as reading books or assisting with children's homework.
The economic literature is limited to very few studies that explicitly analyze
the transmission channels described above. Blanden (2013) proposes a descriptive
decomposition to estimate (i) the extent of intergenerational income persistence if
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intergenerational educational persistence were the only determinant, (ii) the impact
of inequalities in parental income on ﬁlial income within education groups, and (iii)
the cross-eﬀect between parental education and children's residual earnings. She
concludes that the majority of the diﬀerences in intergenerational income persis-
tence between the United Kingdom and the United States are due to the second
eﬀect. Lefgren et al. (2012) use a structural decomposition to establish an upper
and lower bound for the investment and endowment eﬀects using data from a 35
percent sample of Swedish sons and their fathers. They show that only a minority
of the intergenerational income elasticity can be plausibly attributed to the causal
eﬀect of fathers' ﬁnancial resources. Cardak et al. (2013) use stochastic properties
of the intergenerational income elasticity to decompose the estimate for the United
States into the investment and endowment eﬀects without the need for additional
data. They ﬁnd an investment eﬀect of approximately one third and an endowment
eﬀect of approximately two thirds.
A complementary strand of the economic and sociological literature deals with
the intergenerational transmission of certain characteristics that might help to ex-
plain the transmission channels of intergenerational income persistence. For exam-
ple, Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002), Oreopoulos et al. (2006), and Holmlund et al.
(2011) study the intergenerational transmission of education, Hauser and Logan
(1992) discuss the intergenerational transmission of occupational status, and Blau
(1999), Blanden and Gregg (2004), and Dahl and Lochner (2012) analyze the causal
eﬀects of parental income on children's educational achievement.
This chapter builds on the existing literature and seeks to determine the ex-
tent to which the investment and endowment eﬀects contribute to the estimates of
intergenerational income persistence in Germany and the United States. We use
a linear and a nonlinear version of the Blanden (2013) descriptive decomposition
method as well as a structural decomposition method as presented in Lefgren et al.
(2012). Overall, we ﬁnd that while the investment and the endowment eﬀects in
Germany contribute more or less equally to the estimated intergenerational income
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persistence, the investment eﬀect is more pronounced in the United States. In light
of the higher level of privatization in the education system of the United States, this
result seems reasonable. Furthermore, we use unconditional quantile regressions in
order to reveal nonlinearities in the transmission mechanisms along the income dis-
tribution. While there is a mild but steady downward trend of the endowment eﬀect
along the increasing percentiles in the United States, no clear trend can be observed
in Germany. Section 3.2 subsequently presents the theoretical background which
establishes the link between income and human capital. Section 3.3 describes the
data used and discusses possible measurement issues. The results of the estimations
are presented in Section 3.4. To conclude, Section 3.5 includes a brief summary as
well as several economic policy recommendations, which can be derived from our
results.
3.2 Theoretical framework
Our decomposition methods are based on the theoretical framework of Becker and
Tomes (1979, 1986), wherein each family maximizes a utility function dependent
on the parents' consumption and their children's future income. Children's income
is raised when they receive investments in human capital from their parents. In
addition, children's income is inﬂuenced by a variety of inherited endowments in-
cluding race, ability, and other characteristics, family reputation and connections,
and knowledge, skills, and goals provided by their family environment. However, en-
dowments and investments in human capital are not independent from one another,
as children who receive more parental endowments have a higher return to human
capital than those who receive less and therefore the incentive to invest in their
human capital is higher. The equilibrium income of children is thus determined by
the income and endowment of their parents as well as by their fortuitous endowment
and their luck on the labor market.
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3.2.1 Intergenerational income and educational persistence
In the empirical literature, particular attention has been given to the intergener-
ational persistence of income and education. Intergenerational income persistence
measures the inﬂuence of parents' income on the adult income of their children. In
contrast, intergenerational educational persistence analyzes, how strongly the edu-
cational success of children depends on their parents' degree of education. These two
measures are commonly considered separately from one another, though they are
indeed closely related. The standard approach in order to measure intergenerational
income persistence is based on the estimation of a log-linear equation in the form of
log(ysi ) = α1 + β log(y
f
i ) + u
s
1i, (3.1)
where ysi is the lifetime income of the son and y
f
i is the lifetime income of the father.
20
The intercept α1 represents the average lifetime income in the son's generation, and
the slope β is the searched-for intergenerational income elasticity. It states that an
increase in a father's lifetime income by 1 percent increases the expected lifetime
income of his son by β percent. If β = 0, sons' lifetime incomes are independent
of their fathers' lifetime incomes. In this case, a society has complete intergenera-
tional income mobility. In contrast, the higher the value of β, the stronger the link
between the lifetime income of a father and his son is, and consequently, the lower
the intergenerational income mobility. Deviations from the expected income of the
son due to factors orthogonal to the income of the father are summarized in the
idiosyncratic error term us1i.
The estimation of the intergenerational educational persistence provides the ad-
vantage that data on education are usually more easily available and constant over
an adult's lifetime. The intergenerational educational persistence is measured, just
like the intergenerational income persistence, by estimating a linear equation in the
20 Since the analyses in this chapter are limited to father-son pairs, the explanations refer to
the eﬀect of the father's lifetime income on the son's lifetime income. In principle, the subsequent
relationships apply to any parent-child pair.
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form of
Edsi = α2 + γEd
f
i + u
s
2i, (3.2)
where Edsi and Ed
f
i correspond to the son's and the father's education level, respec-
tively. The slope γ is the searched-for intergenerational educational persistence and
can be interpreted in such a way that an increase in the father's education by 1 unit
raises the expected education of his son by γ units. Again, the residual term us2i
captures all deviations from the expected education level of the son orthogonal to
his father's education.
3.2.2 Descriptive decomposition
Linear descriptive decomposition
It is a widely accepted fact that the education level is one of the most important
determinants of a person's lifetime income. The relationship between education and
income can be estimated for the fathers by
log(yfi ) = θ
f + δfEdfi + ν
f
i (3.3)
and for the sons by
log(ysi ) = θ
s + δsEdsi + ν
s
i , (3.4)
where δf and δs correspond to the rate of return to education for the generation of
the fathers and the sons, respectively. In contrast, νfi and ν
s
i capture income varia-
tions that are due to a father's or son's fortune in the labor market. This includes,
for example, beneﬁts from a generous union contract, unusually good or bad job
matches, or working in a ﬁrm that goes out of business (Lefgren et al., 2012). Blan-
den (2013) shows that in order to decompose the intergenerational income elasticity
β, the simple Mincer equations (3.3) and (3.4) can be combined with the mobility
61
Transmission Channels of Intergenerational Income Persistence
measure equations (3.1) and (3.2) to obtain
β =
(
δs
δf
γ
)
R2Edf +
Cov(log(ys), νf )
Var(νf )
(1−R2Edf ) +
1
δf
Cov(νs, Edf )
Var(Edf )
R2Edf , (3.5)
where R2
Edf
is given by Equation (3.3), Cov(log(ys), νf )/Var(νf ) is the estimated
coeﬃcient from a regression of the son's lifetime income log(ysi ) on his father's income
due to luck in the labor market νfi , and Cov(ν
s, Edf )/Var(Edf ) is the estimated
coeﬃcient from a regression of the luck component of son's income νsi on the father's
education Edfi . The ﬁrst term of Equation (3.5) can thus be interpreted as the
magnitude of the intergenerational income elasticity if educational persistence were
the only transmission channel, therefore capturing the endowment eﬀect described
in Section 3.1. Holding the intergenerational transmission of education constant, the
endowment eﬀect increases if the relation between the rates of return to education
in both generations rises or if the relationship between education and income in
the fathers' generation is more pronounced. The second term of Equation (3.5)
measures the impact of the association between the son's lifetime income and the
within-education group inequalities in paternal incomes and can thus be interpreted
as the investment eﬀect described in Section 3.1. The investment eﬀect increases
if the within-education group income inequality increases, which might be due to
divergent rates of return to education between individual occupations with the same
amount of human capital or a strong regional variation in the quality of schools and
universities (Blanden, 2013). Finally, the third term of Equation (3.5) yields the
cross-eﬀect between paternal education and the residual income of the son.
Nonlinear descriptive decomposition
The threefold decomposition of Blanden (2013) implicitly assumes that the relation-
ship between fathers' and sons' lifetime income is linear, i.e., that the intergenera-
tional income elasticity is constant along the entire income distribution. However,
Becker and Tomes (1986) point out that the intergenerational income elasticity can
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assume a concave run when poor families experience credit market constraints that
do not apply for rich families. Consequently, rich families will invest in the human
capital of their children until the marginal costs equal the marginal rate of return,
while credit-constrained families might be forced to invest less than the optimal
amount in their children's education. Thus, a small increase in a poor father's in-
come will have a stronger impact on his son's income than a small increase in a
rich father's income would have. In this case, the intergenerational income per-
sistence will be more pronounced for poor families than for rich families, resulting
in a concave run of intergenerational income elasticity. However, a concave run of
the intergenerational income elasticity neither needs to follow from credit market
constraints nor is market failure implied by concavity. If the income of a father cor-
relates with the unobservable talent of his son, poor fathersregardless of whether
credit market constraints existwill reduce investments in the human capital of
their sons as a result of a lower expected rate of return. Likewise, a concave run is
not a clear indication for credit market constraints. This relationship might be trig-
gered by institutional, social, or unobservable circumstances which inﬂuence poor
and rich families in diﬀerent ways (Grawe, 2004).
On the other hand, a convex run of the intergenerational income elasticity can
be observed if educational policy is designed in such a way as to ensure a basic
level of human capital for all sons, regardless of their fathers' income. Beyond this
socially guaranteed level, all families experience credit market constraints, such that
the total amount of human capital investment in the son is dependent on paternal
income (Bratsberg et al., 2007). Assuming that the unobservable talent of children is
not independent from the socio-economic status of their family, the intergenerational
income persistence among poor families will consequently be lower than among rich
families, resulting in a convex run of the intergenerational income elasticity (Han
and Mulligan, 2001, Grawe and Mulligan, 2002).
Since the descriptive decomposition is to be performed along the income distribu-
tion of the sons, Equations (3.1) and (3.4) are estimated by applying unconditional
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quantile or RIF regressions at diﬀerent income quantiles (Firpo et al., 2009).21 For
this purpose, the values of the dependent variable log(ysi ) are transformed into their
corresponding RIF values using the estimation formula
R̂IF(yi, yˆq, Fˆ) = yˆq +
q − 1[yi ≤ yˆq]
fˆ(yˆq)
, (3.6)
where Fˆ is the estimated cumulative income distribution of the sons, q is the un-
conditional income quantile, fˆ(yˆq) gives the kernel density estimate at the income
value yˆq, and 1[yi ≤ yˆq] is an indicator function, which takes on a value of one if a
son has an income less than or equal to yˆq at the particular quantile and a value of
zero otherwise. Equations (3.1) and (3.4) can then be estimated via ordinary least
squares (OLS) utilizing the transformed RIF values.
3.2.3 Structural decomposition
The descriptive decomposition method described in Section 3.2.2 is likely to overes-
timate the impact of education in the intergenerational transmission process if the
residuals of the respective equations are mutually correlated via, e.g., unobservable
talents or abilities (Hirvonen, 2010). To overcome this problem, a structural ap-
proach to decompose the intergenerational income elasticity into the causal eﬀect of
ﬁnancial resources, the mechanistic transmission of human capital, and the impact
of human capital in the determination of fathers' permanent incomes is presented
in Lefgren et al. (2012). In contrast to Blanden (2013), Lefgren et al. (2012) di-
rectly model fathers' investment in the human capital of their sons by extending
and reformulating Equation (3.2) to
HCsi = ψ + pi1 log(y
f
i ) + pi2HC
f
i + ε
s
i , (3.7)
21 The estimation method of Equations (3.2) and (3.3) remains unchanged.
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where HCsi = δ
sEdsi and HC
f
i = δ
fEdfi . Thus, sons' and fathers' human capital
are measured in Euro or US dollar, depending on their country of residence. Ac-
cording to Equation (3.7), a father may inﬂuence the human capital of his son via
ﬁnancial investments as well as through the direct transfer of human capital. The
ﬁrst parameter pi1 represents the share of a father's income which he invests in the
human capital of his son, multiplied by the eﬃcacy of this investment. The second
parameter pi2 can be interpreted as the share of a father's human capital which is
directly passed on to his son independent of ﬁnancial investments (Lefgren et al.,
2012). Substituting Equation (3.7) into Equation (3.4), the lifetime income of a son
as a function of his father's lifetime income and human capital is expressed by
log(ysi ) = pi0 + pi1 log(y
f
i ) + pi2HC
f
i + η
s
i , (3.8)
where pi0 = ψ + θs and ηsi = ε
s
i + ν
s
i . Finally, substituting Equation (3.3) into
Equation (3.8) yields
log(ysi ) = pi0 + pi1θ
f + (pi1 + pi2)HC
f
i + pi1ν
f
i + η
s
i . (3.9)
Equation (3.9) precisely depicts the notion that an increase in the lifetime income of
the father can inﬂuence the lifetime income of his son via two diﬀerent transmission
channels. If the father's income increase can be ascribed to the father's higher human
capital, this raises the ﬁnancial investments in the human capital and, in turn, the
adult income of his son (pi1). Meanwhile, the higher human capital of the father
directly inﬂuences the human capital of the son, which in turn leads to an increase
in his adult income (pi2). In contrast, an increase in a father's lifetime income which
is due solely to his good fortune in the labor market inﬂuences the child only via
higher ﬁnancial investments (pi1).
65
Transmission Channels of Intergenerational Income Persistence
Given the model of Lefgren et al. (2012), the OLS estimator βˆOLS obtained from
Equation (3.1) converges in probability to
plim(βˆOLS ) = pi1 + pi2
Var(HCf )
Var(HCf ) + Var(νf )
. (3.10)
The estimated intergenerational income elasticity thus depends on three diﬀerent
factors. First, pi1 is the inﬂuence of the father's income when his human capital
remains constant. Second, pi2 describes the impact of the father's human capital
when his income remains unchanged. Finally, Var(HCf )/(Var(HCf ) + Var(νf ))
represents the share of the variance in the fathers' income that can be explained by
the variance in their human capital, which equals R2
Edf
in Equation (3.5). Thus, the
ﬁrst part of the sum can be interpreted as the investment eﬀect, while the second
part represents the endowment eﬀect.
Hereinafter, it will be assumed that there exists an instrument Zfi for the in-
come of the father which can be used in an instrument variables (IV) estimation of
Equation (3.1). The estimated parameter βˆIV then converges in probability to
plim(βˆIV ) = pi1 + pi2
Cov(HCf , Zf )
Cov(HCf , Zf ) + Cov(νf , Zf )
. (3.11)
As in Equation (3.10), pi1 and pi2 are the ceteris paribus inﬂuences of the father's
income and human capital, respectively, while Cov(HCf , Zf )/(Cov(HCf , Zf ) +
Cov(νf , Zf )) represents the share of the covariance between paternal income and
the instrument that can be ascribed to human capital. From Equation (3.10) and
(3.11), it follows that βˆOLS = βˆIV if and only if pi2 = 0 or
Var(HCf )
Var(HCf ) + Var(νf )
=
Cov(HCf )
Cov(HCf , Zf ) + Cov(νf , Zf )
. (3.12)
Since Equation (3.12) does not generally hold, a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
OLS and the IV estimator implies pi2 6= 0. If a Hausman test for endogeneity is
rejected, it may thus be assumed that in addition to the pure investment eﬀect, the
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intergenerational transfer of income is carried out via the direct transfer of human
capital. In this case, diﬀerent instruments Zfi should yield diﬀerent estimates of
βˆIV , depending upon their covariance with the human capital and luck component
of the father's lifetime income.
This circumstance can be used to determine the magnitude of the investment
eﬀect and the endowment eﬀect. Consider ﬁrst the cases where the chosen instru-
ment is correlated solely with the human capital component of the father's income
and thus Cov(HCf , Zf )/(Cov(HCf , Zf ) +Cov(νf , Zf )) = 1. In this case, βˆIV con-
verges in probability to pi1 + pi2. In contrast, if Z
f
i is exclusively correlated with the
luck component of the father's income and thus Cov(HCf , Zf )/(Cov(HCf , Zf ) +
Cov(νf , Zf )) = 0, βˆIV converges in probability to pi1. A direct comparison of the
two IV estimators in combination with the OLS estimator βˆOLS then allows for the
identiﬁcation of the investment and the endowment eﬀects.
Unfortunately, one will generally not be able to ﬁnd perfect instruments for the
father's human capital and luck income components. However, on the monotonicity
condition that Cov(HCf , Zf ) and Cov(νf , Zf ) have the same sign, each estimate
for βIV should lie in the range between pi1 and pi1 + pi2. Thus, if one chooses an
instrument that is highly correlated with the luck component of the father's income,
βˆIV can be interpreted as an upper bound for pi1. In contrast, an instrument which
is primarily correlated with the human capital component of the father's income
yields a lower bound for pi1 + pi2. Finally, the diﬀerence between the two estimators
provides a lower bound for pi2. A complementary bounding procedure is possible
using only instruments for the human capital of the father. In this case, the IV
estimator βˆIV again captures a lower bound for pi1 +pi2. A direct estimation of R2Edf
via Equation (3.3) yields a lower bound for Var(HCf )/(Var(HCf )+Var(νf )). These
results in conjunction with the OLS estimator βˆOLS in turn allow for the estimation
of an upper bound of pi1 and a lower bound of pi2.
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3.3 Data and measurement issues
To examine intergenerational income mobility empirically, long-term panel data of
households that capture information on children while they are still living with
their parents and follow them into adulthood are required (Corak, 2006). For a
valid country comparison, data also need to be highly comparable. We therefore
use the Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) for Germany and the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) for the United States. Both studies collect information on all
adult persons of a household and survey them repeatedly in the subsequent years.
Further, the SOEP and the PSID are part of the Cross-National Equivalent File
(CNEF) project, which oﬀers a harmonized panel data set of the underlying national
household surveys (Frick et al., 2007).
3.3.1 Measurement errors and life-cycle bias
In order to measure lifetime income exactly, all of a respondent's income state-
ments over their entire working life would be required. Thus, in the case of an
academic, income observations over the course of 35 to 40 years would need to be
available (Schnitzlein, 2009). However, within very long-lasting surveys, the number
of people who continue to participate is often considerably reduced. This so-called
panel mortality can correlate with certain characteristics of a person (e.g., income
or education), resulting in a relatively homogeneous longitudinal sample (Fitzgerald
et al., 1998). This circumstance can lead to substantial distortions of the estimation
parameters (panel attrition bias) (Solon, 1989, 1992).
For this reason, lifetime incomes are usually approximated by means of annual
income observations, which consist of a permanent component and a ﬂuctuating
component (Solon, 1989, 1992, Zimmerman, 1992). If parental income is approxi-
mated by income data from only one particular point in time, the classical errors-in-
variables problem occurs and leads to a systematic downward bias of the estimated
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intergenerational income elasticity (attenuation bias) (Wooldridge, 2010). There-
fore, Solon (1992) proposes to form an average of ﬁve annual income observations
for the parental generation in order to reduce the variance of the ﬂuctuating compo-
nent. This procedure does not completely eliminate the bias, but it can signiﬁcantly
reduce it. The estimator for the intergenerational income elasticity can then be
interpreted as a lower bound for the true estimation parameter.22
Haider and Solon (2006) additionally point out that the approximation of chil-
dren's lifetime income depends on the chosen stage of life. Since individual income
during a person's working life assumes a hump-shaped run, income observations at
young ages are lower and thus the lifetime income of a person is underestimated.
Meanwhile, income diﬀerences between high- and low-skilled workers are smaller at
the beginning of their working lives and only increase over time. If incomes are thus
observed at the beginning of the son's working life, this in turn leads to a downward
bias of intergenerational income elasticity (life-cycle bias). This circumstance is
veriﬁed by Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) for Sweden and Brenner (2010) for Ger-
many. Haider and Solon (2006) show that the age range between the mid-30s and
mid-40s produces a good approximation of the sons' lifetime income. Schnitzlein
(2016) uses the income of sons between 35 and 42 years of age.
3.3.2 Sample deﬁnition and variables
The selected samples from the SOEP and the PSID are deﬁned congruently so as to
ensure the reliable comparability of the results. The analysis is based on data from
the years from 1984 to 2013. The individual annual labor income is used, which in-
cludes wages and salaries from both paid employment and self-employment as well
as bonus payments, income from overtime, and proﬁt sharing (Grabka, 2014, Lil-
lard, 2013). The SOEP sample does not include imputed income data.23 All income
22 In the approximation of the children's lifetime income, measurement errors only lead to higher
standard errors.
23 Missing income statements are estimated in the SOEP with the help of personal and household
characteristics as well as past income data (Frick et al., 2012). The CNEF-PSID features no
imputed income data.
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statements are deﬂated to 2010.24 In order to be able to compare the results with
the existing literature, annual real incomes of less than 1,200 Euro/US dollar are not
included in the estimates. To avoid a bias due to wage developments in East Ger-
many after reuniﬁcation, the analysis for Germany is limited to persons who lived
in West Germany in 1989 (Schnitzlein, 2009). In order to estimate the intergenera-
tional educational persistence, we utilize years of schooling as an approximation for
fathers' and sons' level of education.25
The generation of the parents is restricted to the income observations of the
fathers and the generation of the children to the income observations of the sons.26
Fathers' incomes are drawn from the period from 1984 to 1993, from which at least
ﬁve valid income observations must be available. The lifetime income of the fathers
is approximated by the formation of the average of the annual incomes. Only income
observations from the ages of 30 to 55 are considered. Thus, the fathers belong to
the birth cohorts of the period from 1933 to 1959. The income observations of the
sons are drawn from the years from 2003 to 2013, during which time period at least
one valid income observation must be available. Again, the lifetime income of the
sons is approximated by the formation of the average of the annual incomes. Only
incomes from the ages of 35 to 42 are taken into account. Thus, the sons belong to
the birth cohorts of the period from 1961 to 1978, which do not overlap with the
cohorts of their fathers.
Finally, a total of 353 and 602 father-son pairs are recorded in the SOEP and the
PSID, respectively (Table 3.1). On average, the sons earn more than their fathers
in both countries. In Germany the average income of the sons is 15.6 percent higher
than the average income of the fathers, while in the United States it is only 5.1
percent higher than the average income of the fathers. The average age of the
24 For the SOEP, the Consumer Price Index and, for the PSID, the Consumer Price Index of
All Urban Consumers and All Items based on the recommendation of Grieger et al. (2009) are
utilized.
25 This approach implicitly assumes that the impact of one more year of schooling on the level
of education is linear and constant across nations and generations.
26 This limitation is due to the divergent labor market participation of women in both countries,
which can lead to a bias of diﬀerences in intergenerational income elasticity.
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fathers is mid-40s in both countries, older than that of the sons, whose average age
is late-30s. The younger age of the sons might also determine the higher variance
in incomes. German fathers on average spent 10.93 years in school, while their
sons received 12.75 years of schooling. In the United States, fathers' and sons'
educational attainment is relatively similar, with 13.20 and 13.82 years of schooling,
respectively. On the one hand, the fathers in the United States might spend more
years in school due to the longer compulsory school attendance period. While in
most German federal states, 9 years of schooling are mandatory, most U.S. states
require children to stay in school until the age of 16 or 18. On the other hand, the
aftermath of World War II might have signiﬁcantly contributed to the fathers' fewer
years in education in Germany.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Fathers Sons
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
SOEP
Income 40,590.37 19,576.16 46,941.29 27,652.96
Age 46.78 4.54 38.17 1.79
Education years 10.93 2.55 12.75 2.94
Father-son pairs 353
PSID
Income 64,019.61 59,658.27 67,280.92 69,782.23
Age 43.82 5.46 37.87 1.88
Education years 13.20 2.41 13.82 2.03
Father-son pairs 602
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
3.3.3 Descriptive evidence
The logarithmized incomes of the fathers and sons exhibit a positive correlation
(Figure 3.2). The slope of the line of best ﬁt from the bivariate OLS regression is
higher for the United States than for Germany. However, it is also obvious that the
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income data points in both countries are heavily scattered around the regression
line. In order to examine the simple linear relationship more closely, a bivariate
Nadaraya-Watson (NW) estimation is additionally depicted. Both countries show
deviations compared to the OLS estimation. However, the 95 percent conﬁdence in-
tervals include the OLS regression line over nearly the entire distribution of paternal
income. From the bivariate evidence, therefore, it cannot be concluded that the in-
tergenerational income elasticity changes signiﬁcantly along the income distribution
of the fathers.
Figure 3.2: Intergenerational income correlation
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Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: The Nadaraya-Watson estimation uses the Epanechnikov kernel with a range based on
Silverman's rule of thumb. OLS: Ordinary least squares, NW: Nadaraya-Watson.
Figure 3.3 shows the correlation between the education years of fathers and
their sons. Here, the slope for Germany is higher than that of the United States,
implying that sons' years of schooling depend more strongly on the education years
of their fathers in Germany than in the United States. However, while the 95
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percent conﬁdence interval of the NW estimation almost completely contains the
OLS estimator in Germany, the results signiﬁcantly deviate from linearity in the
lower education percentiles in the United States. Thus, sons of low-skilled fathers
receive better education than the OLS estimation would predict. This nonlinearity
might also explain the lower OLS regression slope in the United States.
Figure 3.3: Intergenerational educational correlation
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Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: The Nadaraya-Watson estimation uses the Epanechnikov kernel with a range based on
Silverman's rule of thumb. OLS: Ordinary least squares, NW: Nadaraya-Watson.
3.4 Empirical results
The bivariate estimations in the previous section give a ﬁrst impression of the diﬀer-
ences in the intergenerational income and educational persistence between Germany
and the United States. However, in order to avoid distortions of the estimators due
to divergent age and cohort structures, additional control variables are considered
in accordance with Schnitzlein (2016). With the inclusion of age polynomials and
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the birth years of fathers and sons as well as the number of valid observations of
the son, the obtained estimators slightly decrease (Table 3.2). Notwithstanding,
Germany still shows a lower intergenerational income persistence, with an estimate
of 33 percent, than the United States, with an obtained value of 45 percent.
Table 3.2: Intergenerational income and educational persistence
Germany
β 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.331***
(0.083) (0.081) (0.081)
γ 0.545*** 0.530*** 0.535***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.056)
Cohort controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Age controls No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.053 0.083 0.089 0.224 0.236 0.243
Obs. 353 353 353 353 353 353
United States
β 0.486*** 0.455*** 0.452***
(0.069) (0.071) (0.071)
γ 0.449*** 0.441*** 0.435***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Cohort controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Age controls No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.108 0.140 0.143 0.284 0.295 0.297
Obs. 602 602 602 602 602 602
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Note: Cohort controls include birth years of the fathers and the sons. Age controls include poly-
nomials of the average age of fathers and sons as well as the number of valid observations of the
sons. Standard errors are clustered at the family level and were calculated using paired boot-
strap resampling with 1,000 replications. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
In contrast, families in the United States experience a lower intergenerational
educational persistence than families in Germany. While one more education year
of a father in the United States provides his sons with an average of 0.44 additional
years of schooling, the education years of German sons increase by 0.54 years. These
contrasting results illustrate that intergenerational educational persistence cannot be
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perfectly transformed into intergenerational income persistence. Instead, additional
determinants might strongly inﬂuence intergenerational income persistence, such
that countries can even switch positions in the ranking of intergenerational mobility.
3.4.1 Descriptive decomposition
Table 3.3 shows the results of the linear descriptive decomposition as described in
Equation (3.5). In Germany, the return to education is lower in both generations
than in the United States. While in Germany, each year of education raises a father's
(son's) income by 8.9 percent (8.7 percent), the United States exhibits a value of 16.7
percent (11.5 percent) for the fathers (sons). Thus, the rate of return to education
has declined in both countries over time, but the drop is stronger in the United
States than in Germany.
Table 3.3: Linear descriptive decomposition
β γ δf δs R2Edf
Cov(log(ys),νf )
Var(νf )
Cov(νs,Edf )
Var(Edf )
Germany 0.331*** 0.545*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.320*** 0.254** -0.005
(0.083) (0.054) (0.010) (0.008) (0.044) (0.104) (0.012)
United States 0.486*** 0.449*** 0.167*** 0.115*** 0.229*** 0.374*** 0.024
(0.069) (0.029) (0.017) (0.011) (0.033) (0.074) (0.012)
β Endowment eﬀect Investment eﬀect Cross-eﬀect
Germany 0.331*** 0.179*** 0.172** -0.020
(0.083) (0.032) (0.071) (0.046)
United States 0.486*** 0.149*** 0.289*** 0.048**
(0.069) (0.023) (0.057) (0.024)
Diﬀerence -0.155 0.030 -0.117 -0.068
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the family level and were calculated using paired boot-
strap resampling with 1,000 replications. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
In contrast, the variation in years of schooling explains a greater portion of
the variation in parental income in Germany than in the United States. While in
Germany, 32 percent of income diﬀerences are attributable to fathers' education,
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in the United States only 23 percent of the income variance can be traced back to
educational diﬀerences. However, the relationship between sons' income and the
predicted luck component of their fathers' income is stronger in the United States,
with a value of 0.37, than in Germany, with a value of 0.25. The estimated coeﬃcient
from a regression of the luck component of a son's income on the education years
of his father does not signiﬁcantly deviate from zero either in Germany or in the
United States. Linking these results to the estimates of intergenerational income
and educational persistence, the linear descriptive decomposition reports a higher
endowment eﬀect for Germany, with a value of 54 percent of the intergenerational
income elasticity, than for the United States, with a value of 31 percent. In contrast,
the United States exhibits a higher investment eﬀect, with a value of 59 percent,
than Germany, with a value of 52 percent. The cross-eﬀect of the father's education
on the son's residual income amounts to 10 percent in the United States and -6
percent in Germany. However, the value for Germany is statistically insigniﬁcant.
Regarding the 47 percent diﬀerence in intergenerational income elasticity between
Germany and the United States, more than three quarters is due to the diﬀerence in
the investment eﬀect. Thus, if the investment eﬀect were the same in both countries,
the gap between Germany and the United States would merely be 11 percent.
The linear descriptive decomposition estimates the average endowment and in-
vestment eﬀects in both countries. However, there might be considerable nonlineari-
ties in the relative importance of the two components across the income distribution.
Thus, in a further step we apply unconditional quantile regressions to Equations (3.1)
and (3.4) (Table 3.4). In Germany, intergenerational income persistence increases
with the son's income until the 40th income quantile and remains relatively con-
stant hereafter at about 0.4. In contrast, the United States exhibits a u-shaped run
of the intergenerational income elasticity, indicating that parental income is more
important at the edges of the sons' income distribution than in the middle.
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Table 3.4: Nonlinear descriptive decomposition
Germany β Endowment eﬀect Investment eﬀect Cross-eﬀect
20th percentile 0.262** 0.148*** 0.089 0.024
(0.103) (0.032) (0.084) (0.055)
40th percentile 0.424*** 0.184*** 0.237*** 0.003
(0.076) (0.031) (0.065) (0.040)
50th percentile 0.411*** 0.188*** 0.228*** -0.005
(0.076) (0.032) (0.067) (0.036)
60th percentile 0.399*** 0.189*** 0.191*** 0.019
(0.080) (0.034) (0.069) (0.037)
80th percentile 0.418*** 0.190*** 0.191** 0.038
(0.106) (0.040) (0.086) (0.051)
United States β Endowment eﬀect Investment eﬀect Cross-eﬀect
20th percentile 0.442*** 0.167*** 0.236*** 0.039
(0.086) (0.030) (0.075) (0.034)
40th percentile 0.406*** 0.129*** 0.224*** 0.053**
(0.054) (0.019) (0.049) (0.025)
50th percentile 0.407*** 0.122*** 0.223*** 0.063***
(0.051) (0.019) (0.045) (0.022)
60th percentile 0.392*** 0.132*** 0.202*** 0.058***
(0.052) (0.020) (0.045) (0.022)
80th percentile 0.467*** 0.133*** 0.256*** 0.078**
(0.079) (0.023) (0.062) (0.030)
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the family level and were calculated using paired boot-
strap resampling with 1,000 replications. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
In conclusion, two suggestions can be drawn from these results. Firstly, the
Bratsberg et al. (2007) conjecture of a convex run of intergenerational income elas-
ticity applies to Germany rather than to the United States. This seems reasonable,
as the education system in Germany is largely funded by the public sector, while
privatization in the United States is strong. Thus, there might be a compensating
eﬀect at the lower end of the income distribution in Germany. Applying uncondi-
tional quantile regressions to the intergenerational educational persistence conﬁrms
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this suggestion.27 Secondly, the pattern of the intergenerational income elasticity in
the United States at least partially reﬂects the Becker and Tomes (1986) conjecture,
as the estimated values decrease at the upper end of the sons' income distribution.
Remarkably, the intergenerational educational persistence exhibits an exactly in-
verse shape across the ascending percentiles. The highest estimates are obtained in
the middle of the educational distribution of the sons, while the values at the two
ends are notably smaller.
Figure 3.4: Nonlinear descriptive decomposition
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Notes: Hollow circles are insigniﬁcant estimates at p = 0.05. IIE: Intergenerational income elas-
ticity.
Figure 3.4 shows the development of the endowment and investment eﬀects across
the ascending income deciles of the sons. In the United States, the endowment eﬀect
is signiﬁcantly smaller over the entire income distribution, with a value of around 30
percent, than the investment eﬀect, with a value of approximatly 70 percent. At the
27 See Figure 3.5 in the Appendix.
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lower end of the income distribution, the endowment eﬀect is slightly higher and,
consequently, the investment eﬀect is somewhat lower. In Germany, the endowment
and investment eﬀects are relatively constant at approximately 50 percent. Overall,
the endowment eﬀect is stronger across all income percentiles in Germany, while the
investment eﬀect is continuously higher in the United States. Since the parameters
of Equations (3.2) and (3.3) take on the same values across the entire income distri-
bution, deviations in the relative importance of the endowment eﬀect can be traced
back to nonlinearities in the intergenerational income elasticity or in the rate of re-
turn to sons' educational attainment. The latter is almost constant across the sons'
income distribution in Germany and only slightly deviates downwards at the 20th
percentile.28 In contrast, in the United States the sons' rate of return to education
takes on a slightly u-shaped curve over the ascending income deciles.
3.4.2 Structural decomposition
Although descriptive decomposition methods are a good starting point for ﬁrst in-
sights into the transmission channels of intergenerational income persistence, they
neglect the transfer of unobserved determinants within the family. In order to over-
come this weakness using the structural decomposition method of Lefgren et al.
(2012), valid instrument variables have to be constructed.
For the human capital component of fathers' incomes, we employ years of edu-
cation, level of education, and educational attainment. Fathers' years of education
measure total years of schooling, vocational training, and university education. As
this variable exhibits peaks at certain values due to the organization of the national
education system, the level of education is deﬁned as an ordered variable with ﬁve
levels based on a father's years of education.29 In contrast, educational attainment
indicates the level of fathers' education with respect to high school education.30
28 See Table 3.8 in the Appendix.
29 (1) less than 9.5 years, (2) 9.5 to 11.4 years, (3) 11.5 to 13.4 years, (4) 13.5 to 17.4 years, (5)
more than 17.4 years.
30 (1) less than high school education, (2) high school education, (3) more than high school
education.
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These instruments should be highly correlated with fathers' human capital, but can
be considered more or less independent of fathers' fortune on the labor market.
In order to measure the luck component of fathers' incomes, two instruments are
constructed based on fathers' months of unemployment in the observation period.
This variable is likely to be highly correlated with fathers' human capital, though
unemployment might also occur by chance due to exogenous shocks such as mass
layoﬀs or changing family commitments. Therefore, in the ﬁrst stage, months of
unemployment are regressed on fathers' past income, level of education, and further
human capital variables such as occupation and industry. Ultimately, the residuals
from this regression are used as an instrument for fathers' fortune on the labor
market. In addition, a second instrumental variable indicating the probability that
a fatherdepending on his income, level of education, occupation, and industry in
the ﬁrst three years of the observation periodwas unemployed at least once in
the subsequent two or more observed years is constructed.31 The obtained residuals
should thus be orthogonal to the father's human capital by construction.
Table 3.5 shows the results of an IV estimation of Equation (3.1) using the above
instrument variables. Instrumenting paternal income with years of education, level
of education, and educational attainment yields quite similar results for both coun-
tries. Regardless of the chosen instrument, the obtained values are always higher
than the corresponding OLS estimates. However, the bootstrapped Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test indicates a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between βˆOLS and βˆIV only for the
United States. As the high standard errors in Germany are likely to occur due to
the relatively small number of observations, we nevertheless consider it reasonable
to reject a one-factor model of intergenerational income transmission. Using the
residuals of unemployment and employment status as instrument variables results
in lower estimates for the intergenerational income elasticity compared to the cor-
responding OLS values. However, the IV estimates do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from
zero in both countries and the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test still do not
31 Since the dependent variable is binary, generalized residuals from a probit regressions are
calculated following the approach of Gourieroux et al. (1987).
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support a rejection of the null hypothesis of equal values for Germany. Nevertheless,
Lefgren et al. (2012) show that an imperfect instrument for luck which is a valid
measure for an upper bound of pi1 is suﬃcient.
Table 3.5: IV estimation of intergenerational income elasticity
Germany Years of
education
Level of
education
Educational
attainment
Unemployment
residuals
Employment
status residuals
β 0.495*** 0.527*** 0.554*** 0.188 0.390
(0.177) (0.170) (0.192) (0.472) (1.113)
p-value Durbin-
Wu-Hausman
test
0.280 0.150 0.203 0.280 0.280
First-stage
F-statistic
172.750*** 45.646*** 64.575*** 20.134*** 8.141***
United States Years of
education
Level of
education
Educational
attainment
Unemployment
residuals
Employment
status residuals
β 0.863*** 0.899*** 0.869*** 0.341 0.401
(0.146) (0.160) (0.160) (0.288) (0.289)
p-value Durbin-
Wu-Hausman
test
0.006 0.006 0.014 0.006 0.006
First-stage
F-statistic
177.933*** 44.121*** 60.834*** 38.364*** 31.282***
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Note: Other control variables include the father's and the son's year of birth as well as the num-
ber of valid observations of the son. Standard errors are clustered at the family level and were
calculated using paired bootstrap resampling with 1,000 replications. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
Since the results for the various human capital variables are of equal size, we use
fathers' years of education as an instrument to establish a lower bound for pi1 + pi2.
In order to obtain an upper bound for pi1, we use fathers' unemployment residuals
because the respective IV estimates for both Germany and the United States are
smaller than those obtained with fathers' employment status residuals. Once these
IV estimations are combined with the OLS estimation, Var(HCf )/(Var(HCf ) +
Var(νf )) can be calculated via Equation (3.10). The results of this ﬁrst bounding
procedure are presented in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.6: Structural decomposition I
pi1 + pi2 pi1 pi2 R
2
Edf Investment
eﬀect
Endowment
eﬀect
Germany 0.495*** 0.188 0.307 0.466 0.568 0.432
(0.177) (0.472) (0.520) (30.265) (1.712) (1.712)
United States 0.863*** 0.341 0.523* 0.278 0.701 0.299
(0.146) (0.288) (0.317) (4.456) (0.543) (0.543)
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Note: Other control variables include the father's and the son's year of birth as well as the num-
ber of valid observations of the son. Standard errors are clustered at family level and were cal-
culated using paired bootstrap resampling with 1,000 replications. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
The structural decomposition suggests an upper bound for the mechanistic eﬀect
of fathers' ﬁnancial resources (pi1) of 0.19 in Germany and 0.34 in the United States.
In contrast, the estimated lower bound for the mechanistic eﬀect of fathers' human
capital (pi2) is substantially higher, with a value of 0.31 in Germany and a value
of 0.52 in the United States. Combining these estimates with the respective OLS
estimator, an upper bound for the investment eﬀect in Germany of 57 percent is
obtained, while the value of 70 percent for the United States is markedly higher.
Consequently, a lower bound for the endowment eﬀect is estimated to be 43 percent
in Germany and 30 percent in the United States. However, the investment and en-
dowment eﬀects are insigniﬁcant for both countries. Overall, the direct estimation
of pi1 suﬀers from two problems. On the one hand, constructing a valid instrument
for the luck component of a father's income within the given data set has turned
out to be somewhat problematic. On the other hand, the relatively small number
of observations produces high standard errors of the estimation parameters. Nev-
ertheless, the values are in line with the results of the descriptive decomposition in
Section 3.4.1.
The results of the alternative bounding procedure avoiding the direct estimation
of pi1 are presented in Table 3.7. While a lower bound for pi1 +pi2 is again estimated
using fathers' years of education as an instrument for human capital, a lower bound
for R2
Edf
is now directly drawn from a Mincer regression of the father's income on
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several human capital variables such as level of education, occupation, and industry.
Thus, in combination with the OLS results, an upper bound for pi1 and a lower
bound for pi2 can be calculated using Equation (3.10). This approach produces
more precise coeﬃcients for the United States. The same is true for the variation
of fathers' income due to human capital in Germany, though the results for the
investment and endowment eﬀects are still not signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.7: Structural decomposition II
pi1 + pi2 pi1 pi2 R
2
Edf Investment
eﬀect
Endowment
eﬀect
Germany 0.495*** 0.196 0.299 0.452*** 0.591 0.409
(0.177) (0.159) (0.285) (0.050) (0.497) (0.497)
United States 0.863*** 0.344*** 0.519*** 0.273*** 0.708*** 0.292**
(0.146) (0.094) (0.184) (0.039) (0.127) (0.127)
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Note: Other control variables include the father's and the son's year of birth as well as the num-
ber of valid observations of the son. Standard errors are clustered at the family level were cal-
culated using paired bootstrap resampling with 1,000 replications. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
The second decomposition yields an upper bound for pi1 of 0.20 in Germany
and 0.34 in the United States. The estimation of the extended version of Equation
(3.3) yields a lower bound for R2
Edf
of 45 percent in Germany and 27 percent in
the United States. Consequently, a lower bound for pi2 is estimated to be 0.30 in
Germany and 0.52 in the United States. In both countries, the upper bound for the
investment eﬀect increases slightly, to 59 percent in Germany and 71 percent in the
United States. Hence, the obtained lower bounds for the endowment eﬀect decrease
slightly to 41 percent and 29 percent, respectively. Overall, the obtained values are
very similar to those in Table 3.6.
In total, the results of the structural decomposition support the ﬁndings of the
descriptive decomposition with an investment eﬀect and an endowment eﬀect of
approximately equal size in Germany and a signiﬁcantly higher investment eﬀect
in the United States. Thus, we conclude that sons in the United States are more
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reliant on the ﬁnancial resources of their fathers, whereas the transmission of human
capital within the family is more substantial in Germany.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the transmission channels of intergenerational income persis-
tence in Germany and the United States. Using a descriptive decomposition method,
we ﬁnd that the mechanistic eﬀects of fathers' ﬁnancial resources and human capital
are about equally high in Germany, while the investment eﬀect in the United States
accounts for approximately 70 percent of the intergenerational income elasticity.
We estimate stronger nonlinearities only in the lower income quantiles in the United
States, where the endowment eﬀect is somewhat more pronounced. The results of
the structural decomposition method using diﬀerent bounding procedures support
this supposition. However, the values should be interpreted with caution since they
are insigniﬁcant for the most part.
The overall result of a stronger impact of the investment eﬀect in the United
States seems reasonable in light of a signiﬁcantly higher level of privatization in
the education system than in Germany. The large cross-country diﬀerences in the
relative contribution of the two transmission channels emphasize that policy makers
should not only focus on the level of intergenerational income mobility alone, but
also on the underlying transmission mechanisms. If the endowment eﬀectas in the
case of Germanyis very pronounced, equality of opportunity for children born to
poor parents cannot be reached by the supply of ﬁnancial means alone. Conversely,
an eﬃcient policy must additionally substitute for the missing direct transmission
of human capital within socio-economically weak families. Appropriate means to
improve intergenerational income mobility in this case might be the expansion and
improvement of early childcare facilities, kindergartens, and (full-time) schools with
a good staﬀ-to-student ratio and well-trained educators.
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Appendix
Figure 3.5: Intergenerational persistence along the income distribution
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Table 3.8: Nonlinear descriptive decomposition (detailed estimates)
Germany β γ δf δs R2Edf
Cov(log(ys),νf )
Var(νf )
Cov(νs,Edf )
Var(Edf )
20th percentile 0.262** 0.545*** 0.087*** 0.074*** 0.320*** 0.131 0.007
(0.103) (0.054) (0.008) (0.012) (0.044) (0.124) (0.015)
40th percentile 0.424*** 0.545*** 0.087*** 0.092*** 0.320*** 0.349*** 0.001
(0.076) (0.054) (0.008) (0.008) (0.044) (0.094) (0.011)
50th percentile 0.411*** 0.545*** 0.087*** 0.094*** 0.320*** 0.336*** -0.001
(0.076) (0.054) (0.008) (0.008) (0.044) (0.098) (0.010)
60th percentile 0.399*** 0.545*** 0.087*** 0.094*** 0.320*** 0.280*** 0.005
(0.080) (0.054) (0.008) (0.009) (0.044) (0.100) (0.010)
80th percentile 0.418*** 0.545*** 0.087*** 0.095*** 0.320*** 0.280** 0.010
(0.106) (0.054) (0.008) (0.013) (0.044) (0.125) (0.014)
United States β γ δf δs R2Edf
Cov(log(ys),νf )
Var(νf )
Cov(νs,Edf )
Var(Edf )
20th percentile 0.442*** 0.449*** 0.115*** 0.186*** 0.229*** 0.306*** 0.019
(0.086) (0.029) (0.011) (0.024) (0.033) (0.097) (0.017)
40th percentile 0.406*** 0.449*** 0.115*** 0.144*** 0.229*** 0.291*** 0.027**
(0.054) (0.029) (0.011) (0.015) (0.033) (0.063) (0.012)
50th percentile 0.407*** 0.449*** 0.115*** 0.136*** 0.229*** 0.289*** 0.031***
(0.051) (0.029) (0.011) (0.015) (0.033) (0.059) (0.010)
60th percentile 0.392*** 0.449*** 0.115*** 0.148*** 0.229*** 0.262*** 0.029***
(0.052) (0.029) (0.011) (0.015) (0.033) (0.058) (0.010)
80th percentile 0.467*** 0.449*** 0.115*** 0.149*** 0.229*** 0.331*** 0.039***
(0.079) (0.029) (0.011) (0.020) (0.033) (0.082) (0.014)
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the family level and were calculated using paired boot-
strap resampling with 1,000 replications. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Chapter 4
Intergenerational Income Mobility
among Daughters
4.1 Introduction
Intergenerational income mobility as measured by the extent to which children's
adult income is predetermined by their parents' income has been discussed in the
economic literature for several decades (Solon, 1999, Björklund and Jäntti, 2009,
Black and Devereux, 2011). However, the majority of empirical studies focus on
the association between fathers and their sons. This restriction is commonly made
due to the lower labor market participation of women as compared to men. While
most men work full-time, married women in particular still tend to work only part-
time or not at all. Thus, the individual labor income of a daughter might be an
unreliable indicator for her actual economic status. This is especially true under
the assumption of assortative mating, i.e., if daughters from well-oﬀ families are
likely to marry rich men and decide to reduce their labor supply as a result of their
husbands' higher income (Chadwick and Solon, 2002).32
Studies that consider daughters are relatively rare and the results vary substan-
tially. A comprehensive literature review is, for example, presented by Raaum et al.
(2007). Early analyses that consider individual labor income of daughters, such as
32 The expression assortative mating refers to any nonrandomness in the process of who marries
whom (Chadwick and Solon, 2002). The reasons for systematic mate selection are discussed in the
theoretical analyses of Lam (1988) and Becker (1991). The mostly noneconomic empirical literature
documents positive correlations between spouses with respect to age, physical size, intelligence test
scores, religion, ethnicity, and other personality traits (Epstein and Guttman, 1984). Empirical
research by economists has focused mainly on educational attainment and earnings (Kremer, 1997).
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Altonji and Dunn (1991), Peters (1992), Couch and Dunn (1997), and Mazumder
(2005), estimate about equally high intergenerational elasticities for sons and daugh-
ters in the United States. In contrast, Österberg (2000), Österbacka (2001), Brat-
berg et al. (2005, 2007), Holmlund (2006), Jäntti et al. (2006), and Hirvonen (2008)
estimate lower elasticities for women than for men in the Scandinavian countries.
Dearden et al. (1997) and Blanden et al. (2004) report higher elasticities for daugh-
ters than for sons using data for the United Kingdom. For Germany, Couch and
Dunn (1997) ﬁnd a very low and at times even negative elasticity of women's indi-
vidual earnings with respect to their parents' income. However, the cross-country
pattern of daughters is similar to that of sons, with smaller estimated elasticities in
the Nordic countries and larger values in the United States and the United Kingdom
(Raaum et al., 2007).
Chadwick and Solon (2002) show that in the United States, the elasticity of
daughters' household labor income with respect to her parents' income is of the
same magnitude as the elasticity typically found for individual earnings of sons
and their fathers. Raaum et al. (2007) ﬁnd similar elasticities of family earnings
with respect to parental earnings as the elasticities of individual earnings. They
argue that these somewhat surprising results can be explained by strong assortative
mating, which ensures that the earnings of the spouse are as closely correlated with
parents' income as the children's own earnings. Atkinson et al. (1983) estimate the
elasticity of the daughters' husbands' individual income with respect to their fathers'
earnings to be just as great as the elasticity of sons' income with respect to their
own fathers' earnings. Altonji and Dunn (1991) and Chadwick and Solon (2002)
support these ﬁndings.
This chapter contributes to the literature on intergenerational income mobility
among daughters in Germany and the United States by presenting new results based
on data from the Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) and the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID). The baseline regression analysis shows a higher intergenerational
income elasticity in Germany and a lower intergenerational income elasticity in the
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United States for women as compared to men. However, a separation by marital
status reveals that in both countries, unmarried women exhibit a higher intergener-
ational income elasticity than unmarried men, while married women feature a lower
intergenerational income elasticity than married men. The reason for the lower mo-
bility of unmarried women turns out to be a stronger human capital transmission
from fathers to daughters than to sons. The higher mobility of married women is
driven by a weaker human capital transmission and a higher labor supply elasticity
with respect to the spouse's income of women as compared to men. In order to
further study the eﬀects of assortative mating, the subsample of married children is
analyzed by diﬀerent types of income. It shows that the estimated intergenerational
income elasticity of children's household incomes is even higher than that of their in-
dividual incomes. This can be seen as an indication for strong assortative mating. If
household income is interpreted as a measure of children's actual economic welfare,
there are barely any diﬀerences between sons and daughters. The intergenerational
income elasticity of spouses' income with respect to fathers' income is again rela-
tively high, which in turn supports the hypothesis of strong assortative mating. The
elasticity of the sons-in-law with respect to their fathers-in-law in Germany is even
higher than that of the sons with respect to their own fathers. In the following,
Section 4.2 presents a theoretical model for the interpretation of the diﬀerences in
the intergenerational income elasticity. Section 4.3 discusses potential measurement
errors and reports some descriptive statistics of the data used. Section 4.4 presents
the empirical results before Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical framework
Raaum et al. (2007) provide a framework to understand why intergenerational in-
come elasticities may diﬀer between women and men, wherein the primary mech-
anisms are assortative mating and labor supply responses both with respect to a
person's own hourly wage and with respect to the spouse's wage. In a two-adult
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household, family earnings zi consist of a person i's own earnings yi and those of
the spouse ysi , i.e., zi = yi + y
s
i . If earnings are written as the product of an average
hourly wage wi and hours worked li, then log(yi) = log(wi)+log(li). To represent the
intergenerational association between parents and their children, it is assumed that
the logarithmized wage of the child is a function of the logarithmized income of their
parents log(ypi ) and a term εi capturing the combined eﬀect of factors orthogonal to
parental earnings:
log(wi) = α + λ log(y
p
i ) + εi, (4.1)
where 0 < λ < 1. The positive correlation between the economic status of parents
and their children might be due to the genetic transmission of certain traits and
talents, the endowments a child receives at home, and ﬁnancial investments in the
human capital of the child (Becker and Tomes, 1979, 1986).
Raaum et al. (2007) emphasize that the matching of spouses into marriage is not
a completely random process, as it takes place in numerous private and professional
environments. Educational institutions are, for example, important meeting places
where the density of potential partners is high and search costs are low (Blossfeld
and Timms, 2003). Evidence from diﬀerent countries indicates that about 20 percent
have met their spouse in school, college, or university (Lewis and Oppenheimer, 2001,
Skyt Nielsen and Svarer, 2006). Another reason might be that marriage is motivated
by the economic resources and the risk insurance it provides (Hess, 2004). Finally,
assortative mating may also arise if individual traits and skills are complements in
household production (Becker, 1973, 1974). In this model, the degree of assortative
mating is captured by means of wage resemblance within partnerships:
log(wsi ) = pi log(wi) + (1− pi) log(w¯s) + ξi, (4.2)
where 0 < pi < 1. Equation (4.2) expresses how the logarithmized wage of the
spouse is composed of a weighted average of a person's own logarithmized wage
and the average logarithmized wage in the pool of potential matches log(w¯s) plus
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a residual term ξi representing factors orthogonal to wages, where the parameter
pi captures the extent of assortative mating.33 Assume further that logarithmized
hours worked are a linear function of a person's own and their spouse's logarithmized
wages represented by
log(li) = η log(wi)− ηs log(wsi ) + κi, (4.3)
where η > 0 denotes the elasticity of labor supply with respect to a person's own
wage, ηs > 0 is the cross-elasticity with respect to the wage of the spouse, and κi
includes any individual labor supply components orthogonal to wages.34
Combining Equations (4.1) to (4.3) and allowing η and ηs to diﬀer between men
and women, the logarithmized income of a daughter log(yfi ) can be expressed by
log(yfi ) = β
f log(ypi ) +Ki, (4.4)
where βf = ((1 + ηf ) − piηsf )λ denotes the intergenerational earnings elasticity
of the daughter with respect to her parents' income and Ki = κi + ((1 + ηf ) −
piηsf )(α + εi) − ηsf ((1 − pi) log(w¯s) + ξi) is the combined residual term. Thus, the
elasticity of daughters' earnings with respect to parents' income is increased by the
intergenerational transmission of human capital λ as well as by their own wage labor
supply elasticity ηf , and is lowered by the strength of assortative mating pi as well
as by the cross-elasticity ηsf . Assortative mating and family labor supply decisions
are therefore important components of intergenerational income mobility, even if the
analysis is restricted to individual earnings. In the same manner, Equations (4.1) to
(4.3) can be utilized to derive the association between the income of the daughter's
33 Note that assortative mating is deﬁned in terms of potential incomes rather than realized
incomes. When spouses make joint decisions with respect to labor supply, even a close matching
on potential earnings will not necessarily imply that actual earnings are highly correlated as a
higher spousal wage induces a negative own labor supply response (Raaum et al., 2007).
34 In principle, wage elasticities can be positive or negative as long as leisure is a normal good.
The assumption of positive elasticities is justiﬁed by empirical results indicating that a person's
own wage elasticity is positive but close to zero for men and strictly positive for married women
(Killingsworth, 1983, Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999), whereas the elasticity with respect to the
partner's wage is close to zero for men and signiﬁcantly negative for women (Lundberg, 1988, Juhn
and Murphy, 1997, Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989, Devereux, 2004, Blau and Kahn, 2007).
96
Intergenerational Income Mobility among Daughters
husband and that of her parents:
log(ysfi ) = β
sf log(ypi ) +K
s
i , (4.5)
where βsf = ((1+ηm)pi−ηsm)λ denotes the elasticity of the husband's earnings with
respect to the income of his parents-in-law and Ksi = κi+((1+η
m)pi−ηsm)(α+εi)−
(1+ηsm)((1−pi) log(w¯s)+ξi) is the combined error term. Thus, the in-law elasticity
depends positively on the intergenerational transmission of human capital between
a daughter and her parents λ, the husband's own wage labor supply elasticity ηm,
and the degree of marital sorting pi, while it is aﬀected negatively by the cross-
elasticity of husbands' labor supply with respect to their wives' hourly wages ηsm .
The elasticity of the husband's earnings may exceed that of the daughter's earnings
if (1 + ηm + ηsf )pi > 1 + ηf + ηsm , i.e., if the degree of marital sorting is strong,
if the wife's labor supply is highly responsive to her husband's wage while being
less inﬂuenced by her own wage, and if the husband's labor supply responds more
strongly to his own wage than to the wage of his wife. The association between
parental earnings and combined earnings of partners µf is ﬁnally represented by a
weighted average of daughters' and husbands' elasticities:
µf = (1− θ)βf + θβsf , (4.6)
where 0 ≤ θ = y¯s/(y¯+ y¯s) ≤ 1 is the husbands' average share of household earnings.
As men on average work longer market hours and frequently receive higher wages
than women, θ will typically exceed one half.
4.3 Data and measurement issues
In order to analyze intergenerational income mobility, individual data for at least
two generations of parents and their children are required. For a valid country com-
parison, it is also necessary that the data used are highly comparable. Therefore, the
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Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) for Germany and the Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics (PSID) for the United States are utilized in this study. Both data sets represent
long-term household surveys that capture information on children while they are
still living with their parents and follow them into adulthood. Thus, children who
leave their homes and establish their own households can continue to be covered over
time. In addition, both household surveys are part of the Cross-National Equivalent
File (CNEF) project, which oﬀers a harmonized individual data set of the underly-
ing national household surveys. In particular, it provides a reliable data basis for
international comparisons of incomes, taxes, and transfers (Frick et al., 2007).
4.3.1 Measurement errors and life-cycle bias
To exactly measure the lifetime incomes of parents and their children, all income
statements of a respondent over their entire working life would be required. Thus,
in the case of an academic, for example, income observations of 35 to 40 years would
need to be available (Schnitzlein, 2009). However, with such a long survey period,
the number of people who continue to participate is often signiﬁcantly reduced. This
so-called panel mortality might correlate with certain characteristics of a respondent
(e.g., income or education), resulting in a relatively homogeneous longitudinal sam-
ple (Fitzgerald et al., 1998). Solon (1989, 1992) shows that this homogeneity leads
to substantial downward distortions of the estimated parameters (panel attrition
bias).
Lifetime incomes are thus typically approximated by means of annual income
observations. However, these income statements consist of a permanent as well as
a ﬂuctuating component, where the second causes lifetime income to be determined
with measurement errors (Solon, 1989, 1992, Zimmerman, 1992). Thus, if parental
income is approximated by income data from only one particular point in time, the
classical errors-in-variables problem occurs (Wooldridge, 2010). This, in turn, leads
to a systematic downward bias of the estimated intergenerational income elasticity
(attenuation bias). Solon (1992) proposes to form an average of ﬁve valid annual
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income statements for the parental generation in order to reduce the variance of the
ﬂuctuating component. This procedure does not completely eliminate the bias, but
can signiﬁcantly reduce it. Since the direction of the bias is known, an estimate of
the intergenerational income elasticity can be interpreted as a lower bound for the
true estimation parameter. In the approximation of the children's lifetime income,
measurement errors only lead to higher standard errors.
In addition, Haider and Solon (2006) point out that the observations of children's
lifetime incomes depend on the chosen stage of life. On the one hand, individual
income during the working life assumes a hump-shaped run, so that the income at
the beginning of the working life is lower and thus the lifetime income of a person
is underestimated. On the other hand, diﬀerences in income between high- and
low-skilled workers are smaller at the beginning of their working lives and steadily
increase over time. If incomes are thus observed at the beginning of the children's
working life, this leads to an underestimation of intergenerational income elasticity
(life-cycle bias). This circumstance is veriﬁed by Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) for
Sweden and Brenner (2010) for Germany. For the United States, Haider and Solon
(2006) show that for sons the age range between mid-30s and mid-40s produces a
good approximation of the lifetime incomes. Schnitzlein (2016) uses the income of
sons between 35 and 42 years of age for Germany.
4.3.2 Sample deﬁnition
Taking the previously mentioned problems into consideration, a sample for the anal-
ysis of intergenerational income mobility has to be formed. The selected samples
from the SOEP and the PSID are deﬁned congruently so as to ensure reliable com-
parability of the results. The analysis is based on data from the years of 1984 to
2013. All income statements are deﬂated to the year 2010.35 In the baseline sam-
35 For the SOEP, the Consumer Price Index and, for the PSID, the Consumer Price Index of
All Urban Consumers and All Items based on the recommendation of Grieger et al. (2009) are
utilized.
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ple, individual labor earnings are used.36 Imputed income data are excluded from
the SOEP sample.37 In order to be able to compare the results with the existing
literature, annual real individual incomes of less than 1,200 Euro/US dollar are not
included in the estimates. To avoid a bias due to wage developments in East Ger-
many after reuniﬁcation, the analysis for Germany is limited to persons who lived
in West Germany in 1989 (Schnitzlein, 2009).
Fathers' incomes are drawn from the period of 1984 to 1993, from which at least
ﬁve valid income observations must be available. The lifetime income of the father is
approximated by the formation of the average of the annual incomes. Only income
observations from the age of 30 to 55 years are considered. Thus, the fathers belong
to the birth cohorts from the period of 1933 to 1958. The incomes of the children are
drawn from the years from 2003 to 2013, during which time period at least one valid
income observation must be available. Again, the lifetime income of the children is
approximated by the formation of the average of the annual incomes. Only incomes
from the age of 35 to 42 years are taken into account. Thus, the children belong to
the birth cohorts from the period of 1961 to 1978, which do not overlap with the
cohorts of their fathers.
A total of 354 (601) father-son and 261 (623) father-daughter pairs are thus
recorded in the SOEP (PSID). In Germany (the United States), sons' incomes aver-
age to 46,868 Euro (68,599 US dollar) and are thus higher than daughters' average
incomes of 21,553 Euro (39,937 US dollar). Fathers' incomes average to 40,333 Euro
(66,418 US dollar) and are thus slightly lower than the income average of the sons.
The average age of the fathers is mid-40s in both countries, while the children's
average age is late 30s (Table 4.1).
36 This variable captures wages and salaries from employees as well as self-employed individuals,
and includes bonus payments, overtime pay, and shares in proﬁts (Lillard, 2013, Grabka, 2014).
37 Missing income statements are estimated in the SOEP with the help of personal and household
characteristics as well as past income data (Frick et al., 2012). The CNEF-PSID features no
imputed income data.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
SOEP Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Fathers
Income 40,332.98 18,668.57 10,347.98 153,308.70 615
Age 46.55 4.68 32 53 615
Sons
Income 46,868.19 27,724.28 1,891.89 345,753.30 354
Age 38.13 1.80 35 42 354
Daughters
Income 21,552.95 17,488.95 1,798.41 129,572.60 261
Age 37.90 1.83 35 42 261
PSID Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Fathers
Income 66,418.02 68,892.81 6,026.50 981,877.40 1,224
Age 43.80 5.60 32 53 1224
Sons
Income 68,599.45 71,238.90 1,234.57 915,955.40 601
Age 37.90 1.88 35 42 601
Daughters
Income 39,936.94 39,241.34 1,212.12 532,325.60 623
Age 37.89 1.89 35 42 623
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Figure (4.1) shows the intergenerational income correlation between sons and fa-
thers and daughters and fathers, respectively. The univariate ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimation implies a higher intergenerational income elasticity for the daugh-
ters in Germany, while in the United States, the OLS estimate of the sons seems
to be stronger. The Nadaraya-Watson (NW) estimation shows slight deviations
at the lower and upper ends of the income distribution. However, they are most
likely caused by single outliers in the top and bottom income quantiles. Overall, the
income data points are heavily scattered around the respective regression lines, indi-
cating that parental earnings are not the only determinant for sons' and daughters'
incomes.
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Figure 4.1: Intergenerational income correlation by gender
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Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: The Nadaraya-Watson estimation uses the Epanechnikov kernel with a range based on
Silverman's rule of thumb. OLS: Ordinary least squares, NW: Nadaraya-Watson, CI: Conﬁdence
interval.
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4.4 Empirical results
4.4.1 Baseline estimation
As a starting point, the intergenerational income elasticity of men and women is
estimated using a lower income bound of 1,200 Euro/US Dollar per year in order to
compare the results to the available literature (Table 4.2). In Germany, the intergen-
erational income elasticity appears to be lower for the sons, with a value of 0.3428,
than for the daughters, with a value of 0.4980. These results can be interpreted in
such a way that 34 percent (50 percent) of the income advantage or disadvantage of
a father is transmitted to his son (daughter). Thus, if a father's income is twice as
high as the average income in the parental generation, the expected income of his
son (daughter) will exceed the average income of the ﬁlial generation by 34 percent
(50 percent). The German sons are therefore more mobile than the German daugh-
ters. In the United States, in contrast, the sons exhibit a higher intergenerational
income elasticity, with an estimate of 0.4624, than the daughters, with an estimate
of 0.2607, and are therefore less mobile.
To further explore the eﬀect of divergent labor market participation, the elastici-
ties are re-estimated for married and unmarried sons and daughters, respectively. In
both countries, unmarried women show a higher elasticity than unmarried men. In
Germany, the value for unmarried daughters is 0.4791, while the value for unmarried
sons does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from zero. In the United States, unmarried daugh-
ters exhibit a value of 0.4699, whereas the estimate for unmarried sons is 0.3213.
In contrast, married sons exhibit a higher elasticity than married daughters in both
countries. While for married sons, a value of 0.4804 is estimated, the estimate for
married daughters is lower, with a value of 0.3918, in Germany. In the United States,
married sons exhibit a value of 0.4350, while the value for married daughters does
not signiﬁcantly deviate from zero. Thus, the higher overall elasticity for daughters
in Germany is driven by unmarried children, while the higher value for sons in the
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United States is driven by married children. However, the diﬀerences between sons
and daughters are only statistically signiﬁcant in the case of the United States for all
sons and daughters (p = 0.0341) and for married sons and daughters (p = 0.0064).38
Table 4.2: Intergenerational income elasticity by gender and marital status
Germany United States
Sons Daughters Sons Daughters
All
IIE 0.3428*** 0.4980*** 0.4624*** 0.2607***
(0.0785) (0.1484) (0.0702) (0.0662)
R2 0.0847 0.1419 0.1412 0.0783
N 354 261 601 623
Not married
IIE 0.2024 0.4791** 0.3213*** 0.4699***
(0.1513) (0.1858) (0.1179) (0.0877)
R2 0.1198 0.3401 0.1227 0.1624
N 134 89 203 252
Married
IIE 0.4804*** 0.3918* 0.4350*** 0.1194
(0.0929) (0.2025) (0.0780) (0.0855)
R2 0.1347 0.1324 0.1380 0.0576
N 220 172 398 371
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: Covariates include polynomials of fathers' and children's age as well as their birth year
and the number of valid observations of the children. Standard errors are clustered at the family
level and were calculated using paired bootstrap resampling with 1,000 replications. *** p <
0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. IIE: Intergenerational income elasticity.
The model described in Section 4.2 suggests that the intergenerational income
elasticity of unmarried children is positively inﬂuenced by the impact of fathers' in-
come on their own hourly wages λ and by the elasticity of hours worked with respect
to their own wages η. To explore these determinants, λ and η are estimated for the
subsamples of unmarried sons and daughters, respectively (Table 4.3). In Germany,
38 Utilizing mothers' individual incomes, the obtained estimates are mostly insigniﬁcant.
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the elasticity of hourly wages with respect to fathers' income is 0.3519 for unmarried
daughters, while the estimate for unmarried sons is not statistically signiﬁcant. The
elasticity of hours worked with respect to their own hourly wages is about equally
high for unmarried sons (0.2049) and daughters (0.2031). In the United States, the
eﬀect of fathers' income on children's hourly wages is again lower for unmarried
sons (0.3238) than for unmarried daughters (0.4642). The elasticity of hours worked
with respect to a person's own hourly wages is, however, not statistically signiﬁcant
for either gender. Thus, the higher intergenerational income elasticity of unmarried
daughters is driven by a higher estimated impact of fathers' incomes on daughters'
hourly wages in both countries.
Table 4.3: Determinants of intergenerational income mobility
Germany United States
Sons Daughters Sons Daughters
Not married
λ 0.0510 0.3519** 0.3238*** 0.4642***
(0.0926) (0.1472) (0.0845) (0.0851)
η 0.2049*** 0.2031** -0.0284 0.0689
(0.0661) (0.0820) (0.1584) (0.0800)
Married
λ 0.3524*** 0.2731** 0.4149*** 0.2860***
(0.0876) (0.1266) (0.0661) (0.0626)
η 0.1262* 0.1735* -0.0433 0.0436
(0.0737) (0.0915) (0.0707) (0.0575)
ηs 0.0097 -0.1710*** -0.0113 -0.0958***
(0.0196) (0.0638) (0.0207) (0.0297)
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: Covariates include polynomials of fathers' and children's age as well as their birth year
and the number of valid observations of the children. In the estimation of η and ηs, the number
of children age 0-14 in the household is additionally included. Standard errors are clustered at
the family level and were calculated using paired bootstrap resampling with 1,000 replications.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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For married children, in addition to λ and η, the intergenerational income mo-
bility is presumably negatively inﬂuenced by the cross-elasticity of working hours
with respect to the spouse's income ηs.39 For married daughters in Germany, the
eﬀect of fathers' income on hourly wages is smaller (0.2731) than for married sons
(0.3524). While the elasticity of hours worked with respect to one's own wages is
slightly higher for women (0.1735) than for men (0.1262), there exist stronger diﬀer-
ences in the elasticity of hours worked with respect to the partner's income. While
sons do not react signiﬁcantly to their wives' higher wages, daughters tend to reduce
their labor supply with their husbands' increasing income (-0.1710). In Germany,
the higher intergenerational income mobility of married daughters as compared to
married sons is thus driven by a lower impact of fathers' income on hourly wages and
a stronger reduction of hours worked with respect to their partner's income. These
eﬀects are counteracted though not oﬀset by a higher elasticity of daughters' hours
worked with respect to their own wages. In the United States, the impact of father's
income on the hourly wage is higher for sons (0.4149) than for daughters (0.2860).
The elasticity of hours worked with respect to their own hourly wages is insigniﬁ-
cant for both genders. The elasticity of hours worked with respect to their partner's
income is not statistically signiﬁcant for the sons, however, daughters again reduce
their labor supply with their husbands' rising income (-0.0958). Interestingly, the
absolute value of this estimate is markedly lower than in Germany, implying that
German women react more strongly to the income of their husbands than American
women. Thus, the higher income elasticity of married sons as compared to mar-
ried daughters in the United States is driven by a higher impact of fathers' income
on hourly wages and a weaker reduction of hours worked with respect to partners'
income.
39 Spouses' incomes are approximated by the diﬀerence between children's household incomes
and their individual incomes. In principle, partners in the SOEP and the PSID could also be
matched via their personal identiﬁcation number. However, this procedure further reduces the size
of the already small sample. In addition, the eﬀect of ηs is moderated by the level of assortative
mating pi (see Section 4.2). However, as hourly wages of the spouse cannot be observed, the
comparison implicitly assumes that the strength of assortative mating is approximately equal in
Germany and the United States.
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4.4.2 Eﬀects of assortative mating
The common restriction of the sample to incomes higher than 1,200 Euro/US dollar
seems reasonable as an income of less than 100 Euro/US dollar per month is not
suﬃcient for the subsistence of an individual person in either country. However, mar-
ried individuals might indeed have an individual income of less than 1,200 Euro/US
dollar if the labor division within the family is designed in such a way that primarily
one of the spouses is active in the labor market. Therefore, the intergenerational in-
come elasticities for married sons and daughters are re-estimated without the lower
income limit of 1,200 Euro/US dollar (Table 4.4). The estimated elasticities are
somewhat lower than those presented in Table 4.2, with a value of 0.2006 (0.1531)
for married sons (daughters) in Germany and a value of 0.2860 (0.1451) for married
sons (daughters) in the United States. However, married sons still exhibit a higher
intergenerational income elasticity than married daughters in both countries.40
To further analyze the eﬀects of assortative mating, the elasticity of children's
household incomes with respect to fathers' incomes are additionally reported in
Table 4.4. In Germany, the estimates are about equally high for sons and daughters,
with values of 0.2269 and 0.2360, respectively. In the United States, the estimates are
also very similar for men and women, with values of 0.2744 for the sons and 0.2671
for the daughters, though they appear to be somewhat higher when compared to
Germany. Thus, although married women's individual incomes depend less strongly
on their family background than those of married men, the genders do not diﬀer
much with regard to household incomes. If household income is interpreted as the
actual economic status of a child, sons and daughters in the respective countries are
therefore about equally mobile.
40 If an individual features an income of zero, the logarithmized income cannot be calculated
and is thus dropped from the regression analysis. To control for a sample selection bias due to this
issue, a parallel Heckman estimation with the number of children younger than 14 years of age as
the selection variable is performed (see Table 4.5 in the Appendix).
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Table 4.4: Intergenerational income elasticities by type of income
Germany United States
Sons Daughters Sons Daughters
Own individual income
IIE 0.2006*** 0.1531*** 0.2860*** 0.1451
(0.0771) (0.1187) (0.0693) (0.1056)
R2 0.0763 0.0459 0.0973 0.0523
N 230 188 408 398
Household income
IIE 0.2269*** 0.2360*** 0.2744*** 0.2671***
(0.0684) (0.0527) (0.0485) (0.0563)
R2 0.1101 0.1351 0.1172 0.1073
N 235 226 417 441
Spouse's individual income
IIE 0.4029*** 0.3755** 0.0474 0.2561***
(0.1531) (0.1808) (0.0913) (0.0613)
R2 0.0742 0.1430 0.0244 0.0772
N 193 222 366 427
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: Covariates include polynomials of fathers' and children's age as well as their birth year
and the number of valid observations of the children. Standard errors are clustered at the family
level and were calculated using paired bootstrap resampling with 1,000 replications. *** p <
0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. IIE: Intergenerational income elasticity.
Because the elasticity of household incomes with respect to parental earnings is
a weighted average of the children's and their spouses' elasticities (Section 4.2), the
observed diﬀerences between the elasticities of individual incomes and household
incomes are driven by the correlation between fathers-in-law and their children-in-
law. This suggestion is supported by the estimated elasticities from a regression of
the logarithmized incomes of children's spouses on the logarithmized incomes of the
fathers. The elasticity of the son-in-law is estimated to be 0.3755 in Germany and is
thus even higher than the corresponding value of the sons. Surprisingly, the income
of the daughter-in-law is also strongly correlated with the income of her husband's
father with an estimated elasticity of 0.4029. In the United States, there is no
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signiﬁcant impact of a father's income on his daughter-in-law's income. However,
the elasticity of sons-in-law with respect to their fathers-in-law is again relatively
strong with an estimated value of 0.2561. This estimate is again equal in size to the
corresponding value for the sons. Overall, the results imply a considerable extent of
assorative mating in both countries.41
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes intergenerational income mobility among daughters in Ger-
many and the United States. The baseline estimation shows a higher intergenera-
tional income elasticity in Germany and a lower intergenerational income elasticity
in the United States for women as compared to men. However, a separation by
marital status reveals that in both countries, unmarried women exhibit a higher in-
tergenerational income elasticity than unmarried men, while married women feature
a lower intergenerational income elasticity than married men. The reason for the
lower mobility of unmarried women appears to be a stronger human capital trans-
mission from fathers to daughters than to sons. The higher mobility of married
women is driven by a weaker human capital transmission and a higher labor supply
elasticity with respect to spousal income. The estimated intergenerational income
elasticity of married children's household incomes is even higher than that of their
individual incomes. This can be seen as an indication for strong assortative mating.
If household income is interpreted as a measure of children's actual economic welfare,
there are barely any diﬀerences between sons and daughters. The intergenerational
income elasticity of spousal income with respect to parental income is again rela-
tively high, which in turn supports the hypothesis of strong assortative mating. The
elasticity of the sons-in-law with respect to their fathers-in-law in Germany is even
higher than that of the sons with respect to their own fathers.
41 In the cases of the daughters-in-law in Germany and the sons-in-law in the United States, the
Heckman estimation reports a signiﬁcant sample selection bias. However, the results are relatively
similar with values of 0.4574 and 0.2439, respectively (Table 4.5).
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Appendix
Table 4.5: Heckman estimation of intergenerational income elasticity
Germany United States
Sons Daughters Sons Daughters
Own individual income
IIE 0.1921** 0.2101* 0.2628*** 0.1458
(0.0777) (0.1261) (0.0860) (0.1127)
N 236 228 421 443
p(λ) 1.000 0.102 0.449 0.970
Household income
IIE 0.2264*** 0.2372*** 0.27722*** 0.2672***
(0.0705) (0.0522) (0.0514) (0.0566)
N 236 228 421 443
p(λ) 0.639 1.000 1.000 1.000
Spouse's individual income
IIE 0.4574** 0.3631* -0.1203 0.2439***
(0.1872) (0.1886) (0.2534) (0.0672)
N 236 228 421 443
p(λ) 0.006 1.000 0.391 0.069
Source: SOEP (1984-2013), PSID (1984-2013).
Notes: Covariates include polynomials of fathers' and children's age as well as their birth year
and the number of valid observations of the children. The number of children age 0-14 in the
household is used as the selection variable. Standard errors are clustered at the family level
and were calculated using paired bootstrap resampling with 1,000 replications. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. IIE: Intergenerational income elasticity.
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Conclusive remarks
The present dissertation deals with intergenerational income mobility in Germany
and the United States. The transmission process of income diﬀerences from one
generation to the next is an important aspect of income inequality as it captures the
dynamic component of the income distribution. A high level of intergenerational
income elasticity implies that income diﬀerences are mainly caused by divergent
talents, abilities, and preferences. In this case, income inequality is less problematic
and might even encourage investments in human capital and eﬀorts to increase
earnings. On the contrary, if children's future level of income is predetermined
for the most part by their family background, future prospects of poor children
are literally eliminated. This means that a high level of intergenerational income
mobility and, closely related to this, equality of opportunity should be a primary
goal for economic policy in light of the rising level of interpersonal income inequality.
The analyses in the previous chapters use comparable data from Germany and
the United States in order to contrast the results for the two countries. Thus, they
contribute to the empirical literature on intergenerational income mobility in both
countries as well as to the literature on country comparisons. The ﬁrst part is moti-
vated by an unclear position of Germany in the international ranking of intergenera-
tional mobility levels. We therefore conduct a direct comparison of the structure and
extent of intergenerational income mobility in Germany as compared to the United
States. The results support the widely accepted view that the intergenerational
income elasticity is higher in the United States than in Germany. However, while
the results for the intergenerational rank mobility do not diﬀer much between the
two countries, Germany exhibits a higher intergenerational income share persistence
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than the United States. We ﬁnd no indications for a nonlinear run of the intergen-
erational income elasticity which might point to credit market constraints. A ﬁnal
decomposition of intergenerational income inequality shows both higher income mo-
bility and stronger progressive income growth for Germany compared to the United
States. Overall, we cannot identify a clear ranking between the two countries.
The second contribution examines the transmission channels of intergenerational
income persistence. To deduce concrete economic policy actions, it is important
to know why intergenerational income persistence is present in a certain country.
Firstly, income diﬀerences could be inherited due to the actual higher income of par-
ents allowing them to directly invest in the human capital of their children. Secondly,
human capital might also be transferred from parents to children without ﬁnancial
expenditures. We perform a descriptive as well as a structural decomposition and
ﬁnd that the direct eﬀect of a father's ﬁnancial means is much more important in the
United States, whereas the indirect eﬀect of a father's nonmonetary human capital
transmission is predominant in Germany. These results are in line with the fact that
the share of private expenditures in the American education system is signiﬁcantly
higher than in Germany. In conclusion, equality of opportunity in Germany cannot
be reached by the supply of ﬁnancial means for poor children alone. Rather, so-
cial policy must substitute for the missing direct human capital transmission within
low-income families.
The third analysis deals with the diﬀerences in intergenerational income mobility
between sons and daughters. Individual incomes are likely to be an unreliable mea-
sure of daughters' actual economic status in most cases because married women in
particular tend to reduce their working hours as a result of joint decisions on house-
hold labor division. The existence of assortative matingthe tendency of women
from well-oﬀ families to marry rich menaggravates this problem. The baseline
analysis shows that women in Germany exhibit higher elasticities and thus lower
mobility levels than men, while in the United States this relation is reversed. A de-
tailed analysis by marital status suggests that in both countries unmarried women
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exhibit higher elasticities than unmarried men, while married women show lower
elasticities. This is obviously due to a stronger human capital transmission from fa-
thers to their daughters as compared to their sons in the case of unmarried children,
and due to a lower human capital transmission and a higher cross-elasticity with
respect to husbands' wages for daughters in the case of married children. Overall,
there appears to be a signiﬁcant extent of assortative mating as spouses' incomes
as well as overall household incomes are likewise highly correlated with parental
earnings.
Nevertheless, the statistical analyses in this dissertation suﬀer from at least two
problems concerning the available data sets. On the one hand, the number of ob-
servation in the parent-child samples is relatively small such that the estimated
standard errors are often quite large. This becomes especially obvious in the struc-
tural decomposition analysis in Chapter 3.4.2, where hardly any signiﬁcant estimates
can be obtained. A further restriction to more speciﬁc subsamples is thus often not
possible. On the other hand, data for Germany is only available for one generation of
parents and their children. A dynamic analysis of intergenerational income mobility,
as performed in several studies available for the United States and the Scandinavian
countries, is thus not feasible and the implications derived in this dissertation might
not be transferable to past and future generations. Here, an improvement of data
availability might enable future researchers to obtained more detailed results.
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